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Participation as Tyranny! 
Struggle for Social Control in Rural Uganda 
Abstract 
by Graeme Reniers 
This thesis critically examines the role of peasant participation in development processes 
in Uganda, as embodied by the 'good' governance agenda. The historical nature of the 
struggle for social control and peasant resistance to control in Sub-Saharan Africa was 
explored along with literature concerning contemporary manifestations of this struggle as 
found in the participatory processes of the 'good' governance agenda. A qualitative case 
study using Marxist dialectical materialist methods was performed to determine the 
nature of the relationship between 'good' governance defined participatory processes and 
the struggle for social control in Uganda. The study found Ugandan peasants to have 
historically resisted elite control, and that elites have responded with limited democratic 
and economic concessions while struggling to expand social control. An analysis of 
Uganda's version of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, and the role of local 
government units and civil society organizations, as part of the framework for 
participation provided by the 'good' governance agenda, found the trend of granting 
limited democratic concessions while obscuring the struggle to expand elite social control 
continues. The thesis concludes that participatory 'good' governance models are best 
understood as a sophisticated tool of class struggle, wherein bourgeois classes (domestic 
and international) struggle to socially control and subvert popular classes, and is therefore 
a system of tyranny. 
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Participation as Tyranny! 
Struggle for Social Control in Rural Uganda 
Chapter One: The Question, Theory, Statement and Methods 
With the collapse of the communist model of development and the conclusion of 
the Cold War in the early 1990s, capitalism appeared to be the only remaining path to 
development. However, the most recent capitalist model of development, exercised 
through the use of structural adjustment, also failed to reduce poverty and caused a social 
backlash in recipient countries. Attempts at top-down development had failed, and were 
delegitimized in favour of bottom-up approaches. With the sustainability of structural 
adjustment programmes waning, powerful capitalist forces - represented internationally 
by the World Bank Group1 - needed a new development agenda. Hence, bottom-up 
forms of democracy were anointed as the only legitimate form of 'good' governance. 
Though continuing neoliberal structural adjustment, this new agenda of 'good' 
governance promised to reduce poverty by bringing all social groups into the 
development process. Participation, once associated with social movements as an 
exercise to counter dominance and social control, was now being championed by 
dominant actors as an integral part of 'good' governance. Hence, this new agenda held 
peasants, once considered incapable of any political role, to have first-hand knowledge of 
rural development needs, and whose participation in policy formation was now a 
prerequisite for development. 
As those in power ostensibly allowed bottom-up processes to shape policy, 
mainstream development discourse optimistically spoke of a paradigmatic shift in theory. 
' This Group includes the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 
addition to the World Bank itself. 
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New buzzwords emerged and by participating in policy formation, 'civil society' became 
the new driver of social change and 'poverty reduction', while powerful actors such as 
the World Bank were no longer necessarily considered obstacles to 'empowerment'. 
Older concepts such as class struggle and imperialism no longer appeared relevant. 
Indeed, power relations and imbalances ceased to be of much importance in mainstream 
participation discourse, as with the right technical procedures all social groups and 
'communities' could be equally brought into the process - and thus, all interests could 
simultaneously be served in 'multi-stakeholder' approaches. 
Uganda was championed by the World Bank and mainstream theorists as proof 
this new 'good' governance agenda could work. With stable economic growth and 
relative peace following decades of political, economic and social chaos and violence, 
Uganda appeared as a true success story. Its participatory processes embodied by local 
governance, civil society, and its Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) were 
considered a model of 'good' governance from which other governments needed to learn. 
Indeed, Uganda's President Museveni, once a revolutionary peasant guerrilla leader, was 
embraced by American and World Bank presidents as emblematic of a new era of world 
leaders. Yet, despite peasants being 'empowered' to 'participate' in a relatively 
'democratic' system of 'good' governance, Uganda continued the same neoliberal 
capitalist path to development hitherto made conditional by the World Bank and IMF. 
Furthermore, despite relatively high rates of economic growth, disparities have widened 
(Muhumuza, 2002) and poverty has increased (United Nations, 2008). 
As the initial optimism concerning international affairs waned following the Cold 
War, the prospect of a top-down embrace of bottom-up development stagnated. Among 
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more critical theorists, naivety towards power relations was - at most - short lived. 
Critics amongst several ideological camps and social science disciplines have raised 
alarms over the uniform policies that supposedly unprecedented participatory processes 
have produced. Doubts have been raised over the likelihood that poor people in less 
developed countries prefer the same neoliberal model of capitalism that bourgeois classes 
in rich countries prefer, leaving Cooke and Kothari (2001) to ask: Participation: the New 
Tyranny? Investigations into how empowering the practice of 'empowerment' really is, 
how democratic 'democracy' really is, and how participatory 'participation' really is, 
soon emerged. 
Much of this research has found that oppressed peoples have not been 
empowered, that meaningful democracy has not grown, and that participation has become 
a technical exercise used to legitimize predetermined outcomes. Many studies have found 
the interests of the rich and poor still contradict each other (Mohan and Stokke, 2000; 
Kamruzzaman, 2009); that power relations and imbalances continue to shape the way 
social groups are brought into development processes (Cornwall and Brock 2005; Cheru, 
2006); and Marxist theorists have shown that class analysis is still a relevant tool in our 
understanding of social change (Saul, 1997b, 2005, 2010; Brass 1997, 2007b;). 
Furthermore, many studies have found what is now considered 'good' governance does 
not serve to empower the poor to participate, but rather to strengthen the dominance of 
international bourgeois and domestic elites (Abrahamson, 2000; Cooke and Kothari, 
2001; Fraser 2005). Such findings have recently led to "calls for participation to be re-
articulated within broader processes of social and political struggle" (Leal, 2010). 
It is the objective of this thesis to contribute to this re-articulation of participation 
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by investigating a model and so-called 'success' story of the 'good' governance agenda. 
By virtue of being a model for other countries to later implement, Uganda presents an 
excellent opportunity to critically examine the parameters of 'good' governance in its 
most established form in Sub-Saharan Africa. Furthermore, the contextual history of 
social struggle and the nature of power embedded in Uganda's institutions of 'good' 
governance best exemplifies how the practice of participation has shifted from an 
exercise of emancipation towards a bourgeois attempt to achieve social control through 
the reconceptualization of participation provided by the 'good' governance agenda. It was 
poor peasants in Uganda that established a grassroots system of democratic local 
governance during a six-year civil war in the 1980s that challenged elite dominance and 
brought the current central government to power. Nonetheless, with the reconfiguration 
of local governance within the 'good' governance agenda, and the introduction of PRSPs 
and the rising importance of civil society, elite classes have (re)emerged to capture a 
dominant political-economic position in Uganda. We must look deeply into this example, 
we must critically examine the role of the Ugandan peasants and dominant classes in 
political processes, and we must determine the nature of the relationship between 'good' 
governance defined participation and the struggle for social control in Uganda. 
Recent events in Northern Africa and parts of the Middle East make this research 
particularly timely and relevant. As the world's gaze has turned to the inspiring image of 
oppressed peoples in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya challenging tyrannical political systems, 
many elsewhere are asking when their turn will come. While this thesis does not seek to 
predict when or where "Egyptian style protests"2 will occur, it does seek to contribute to 
the understanding of the struggle over social control embodied by the 'good' governance 
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agenda, which may also help explain the current absence of powerful peasant movements 
in Sub-Saharan Africa. Political leaders in countries observing principles of 'good' 
governance, will present participatory processes as evidence their rule is not tyrannical, 
and that such social uprising are therefore unnecessary. In direct contradiction to such 
foreseen claims, this thesis investigates the role participatory processes and 'good' 
governance play in the struggle by dominant actors for social control - using Uganda's 
'successful' model as a case-study. 
Notwithstanding the emergence of critical studies on the 'good' governance 
agenda, much research on participatory processes continue to be plagued by technocracy 
- i.e., an overemphasis on technical aspects such as meeting schedules, locations and 
facilitation methods - with few studies considering deeper social implications of 
participatory processes themselves being reduced to a technical procedure (Booth, 2005; 
Driscoll and Evans, 2005; Jutting et al. 2005; Craig and Porter, 2006). Furthermore, most 
Marxist research on participation and 'good' governance has concentrated on its imperial 
implications and the World Bank and IMF's not-so-secret agenda of expanding capitalist 
structures (Moore, 2005; Stewart and Wang, 2003; Gould, 2005; Sumner, 2006; Ruckert, 
2007). This has left the examination of national and local political implications and 
processes unsatisfactorily analyzed. This thesis seeks to overcome both shortcomings -
that is an overemphasis on technical aspects and an under-emphasis on the role of 
domestic elites - by examining participation and the structures of 'good' governance at a 
national level and local level, albeit with references to international actors such as the 
World Bank. By providing an in-depth analysis of the reality of participation in Uganda, 
this thesis seeks to provide a useful resource for comparative research on countries that 
2 As opposition leader Dr. Besigye called for following Uganda's most recent elections. 
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followed Uganda in adopting processes of 'good' governance, and strives to be useful to 
critical scholars in deepening our understanding of the nature of social control, as the 
struggle for emancipation continues. 
History of Struggle: Control and Peasant Resistance in Africa 
To understand the role of 'good' governance participation within the broader 
context of the struggle for social control, it is necessary to consider the historical nature 
of- and the forms of governance embodied by - such a struggle. A literature review on 
the struggle for social control by dominant classes, and peasant resistance seeking to 
evade control, will inform us of the historical patterns and legacies of governance that 
shape current incarnations of this struggle. Hence, an examination of the historical 
relationship between peasants (who resist control) and dominant classes (who struggle for 
control) and the forms of governance this struggle has produced, will provide context 
from which the current 'good' governance agenda has been formed in Uganda and 
elsewhere. 
Well established in Europe and Latin America, theory on peasant relations to 
dominant classes and states in Africa has been hindered by the notion of an autonomous 
peasantry (Kasfir, 1984a) and debates as to how capitalist penetration has reorganized 
production and social relations. Lenin (1970), Hobson (1971), and Luxemburg (1951) 
articulated the idea that capitalism's need for primitive accumulation required the 
opening of new markets on the fringe of imperialism. For Kautsky (1988) this spelled the 
inevitable demise of a peasantry unable to compete with capitalist forces; conversely 
Meillasoux (1973) argued that non-capitalist modes of production are needed for 
capitalism to survive, and thus peasant classes survive to effectively subsidize capitalist 
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production, and fittingly Bettelheim (1975) suggested capitalism partially dissolves but 
maintains pre-existing production modes. For proponents of the idea of an autonomous 
African peasantry, all these ideas "ignore the autonomous role of peasant societies in 
reproducing themselves" (Bunker, 1987:3). Bunker argues that such theories deny 
peasant agency and maintains that it is erroneous to look solely at capitalist expansion as 
the source - or driver - of change, in (post)colonial African society; rather, the dynamics 
of change can be found in resistance to imperialism and the internal conflicts, alliances, 
and new power dynamics imperialism created. 
The idea that rural Africa was still pre-capitalist after colonization was first put 
forth by proponents of African Socialism (eg. Nyerere, 1968) and later echoed by Hyden 
(1980, 1983). Hyden's main conclusion is that unlike Europe where the peasantry was 
captured by wage labour, and Latin America where it was captured by tenancy 
arrangements, African peasants have not been captured by other social classes. An 
'economy of affection' entails that a free-holding peasantry can rely on kin relations 
rather than relations to the state for social security, thereby enabling peasants to use an 
'exit-strategy' option - wherein they drop out of export production and withhold the 
ability of the state to capture surplus - as leverage and autonomy from dominant classes. 
This idea has been strongly refuted, in particular by Mamdani (1997:13) who 
asserts that: "Hyden misses precisely the relations through which the 'free' peasantry is 
'captured' and reproduced." Hyden attempted to find a Latino-Asian prototype for 
African peasant capture, but coupled with land abundance and lack of an immediate 
overlord, concludes the peasantry is free. However, according to Mamdani, Hyden failed 
to account for the unequal socio-economic relations that African peasantries are 
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compelled to enter, which is twofold. First, differentiated village social structures 
indirectly compel poor peasants to 'voluntarily' enter unequal relations with rich peasants 
in a manner that effectively transfers surplus labour from peasants poor in land and 
labour implements to those rich in land and able to hire (Mamdani, 1997:80). These 
indirect pressures from below are compounded by direct coercion from above (i.e. 
directives from the state) in the form of forced labour, contributions, enclosures, cash 
crops, sales, and taxation (Mamdani, 1997:83). This second set of directives are extra-
economic; that is, the resulting unequal relations are driven by an urban bourgeois in the 
political realm by way of guaranteed market functioning and the sanctity of private land 
(Mamdani, 1987a). In short, the idea of an autonomous African peasantry ignores rural 
capitalist penetration, peasant responsiveness to price incentives, the incorporation of 
peasants into wider class relations via patronage politics, and the power/ability of non-
peasant classes to exploit the peasantry (Kasfir, 1984a). Thus, as Bernstein (1977) notes, 
"[t]he peasantry must be analysed in its relations to capital and the state." 
Local populations in the whole of Sub-Saharan Africa were introduced to new 
goods, services, economic and labour demands under colonialism, "with the result that 
new needs were generated which could only be met by participation in the cash-based 
market economy. Two ways of participating were open to them [peasants]: sale of their 
labour or sale of their agricultural produce" (Saul and Woods, 1971:107). First introduced 
by coercion, taxation, and forced labour, commodity production became a necessity for 
African peasants. The 'exit-strategy' is further problematicized by the understanding that 
once any level of commodity relations are introduced it becomes of secondary 
importance to compare resources spent in commodity and subsistence production; it is 
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erroneous to assume that a household that is far more active in subsistence production 
rather than commodity production is able to withdraw from the latter (Bernstein, 1977). 
Effectively captured by capitalist relations, class formation evolved among the 
African peasantry, though not in rigid 'advanced' capitalist forms (Gibbons and 
Neocosmos, 1985; Bernstein, 2004). Labour implements and land access can be used to 
determine relations to the means of production in a tripartite classification of poor, 
middle, and rich peasant classes in Sub-Saharan Africa3; however, these strata are 
evolving and fluid (Kasfir, 1984b) leaving some to suggest other methods. Relative 
wealth, often put forward, is not a useful method due to the unpredictability (seasonal, 
weather, et cetera) of agricultural production (Bernstein, 1977). Sklar (1979) made the 
case that relations to power are a more important determinant of class than relation to 
production. That the African state routinely used customary practice in rural areas - not 
extending civil power beyond urban areas - to enforce what Mamdami conceptualized as 
decentralized despotism, supports the idea that relations to power determines class in 
peasant communities. This power difference is more political than economic, leaving 
peasants not completely within (nor out) of free market, but "on the interstices of the 
market and direct compulsions" (Mamdani, 1997:183). Thus, the colonial state was 
organized along pre-capitalist lines in rural areas wherein power over peasant property, 
tax assessment and collection was fused with the chief; a system maintained even as 
bourgeois citizenry rights were granted to urban African middle-classes before and after 
3 'Poor' peasants depend on the regular exchange of their labour-power for social reproduction, as capitalist 
class formation does not require a landless proletariat, but merely workers with insufficient land to meet 
reproductive necessities; 'middle' peasants have enough family labour and land for reproduction, but only 
in specific relations with other peasant strata and modes of production; and 'rich' peasants, sometimes 
referred to as kulaks, accumulate sufficient capital to invest in technology/labour power, and potentially 
may become capitalist farmers (Bernstein, 1977). Researchers often use similar but often more stringent 
stratification methods but mostly rely on some form of labour-allocation for the designation of African 
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independence (Mamdani, 1991:241-2). This suggests that class identities in rural settings 
are more determined by the political realm of customary law as opposed to the economic 
realm of relations to production; that is, a chief and various peasants may appear to have 
similar relations to production but their class stratification is nuanced in the political 
realm. This argument, however, is inadequate in that it does not account for economic 
stratification among poor, middle, and rich peasants that do not have political positions or 
connections, and therefore erroneously assumes consistent social motivations for peasants 
of differing economic strata but commonly without political connections. Thus, Kasfir's 
(1984b) idea that similar economic motivations and opportunities - not solely dependent 
on political connections or relations to the means of production - is a more useful 
determinant of class designation is more appropriate than designations based solely on 
political connections. To a certain degree, nonetheless, one could foresee rich and poor 
peasants having similar general economic interests (for example, higher market prices) 
but having dissimilar interests in class struggle; i.e., while rich and poor peasants may 
both be motivated by higher prices, their ability (or opportunity) to reap rewards on such 
prices is differentiated by their relations to the means of production - which may in turn 
determine their relations to each other, especially considered that rich peasants often 
employ poor peasants. Thus, relations to the means of production are still the most 
important determinant of social interest, and therefore the most appropriate means of 
designating social class. 
The stratification of African rural classes are nonetheless complex and dynamic, 
and cannot be given full justice in this thesis; the concern here is rather to discuss and 
analyse how the peasantry is brought into the development process politically. This 
peasant classes. 
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requires not a complete examination of African rural classes, but an understanding that 
class differentiation does exist, and that social interests are largely determined by 
relationships to the means of production and other classes. As alluded to above, peasants 
have historically been marginalized in official political arenas and subjected to 
authoritarian rule legitimized by those in power as 'customary', but criticized by 
dissidents as 'decentralized despotism'. That is why the issue of participation, which 
proponents of 'good' governance claim to reverse this long-standing trend, is peculiar in 
its stated objective of bringing the peasantry into the decision making process. However, 
the fact that peasants have historically been granted little political power (other than a 
select few rich peasants) does not mean they have had little or no political role in shaping 
the social structures that confine them. Thus, the attention of this literature review now 
turns to an examination of the nature of political power peasants have wielded without 
the benefit of state machinery. 
As much as the peasantry has been labelled an 'awkward class' economically 
(Shanin, 1972), whose labour is necessary for capitalist production but ultimately is 
smothered and exploited by it (de Janvry, 1981), it has likewise been labelled awkward 
politically. Citing social isolation and a livelihood tied more to nature than society, 
Marx's (1963) The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte set the precedent for a 
theoretical pigeonholing of peasants to be socially conservative, regressive, and as 
victims of the very movements for which they are mobilized. Doubly unable to form a 
unified movement or a political program, the peasantry was regarded as being readily 
manipulated into contradictory movements (see Lukacs, 1971:61; Hobsbawm, 1973). 
That said, it was seen by early Marxists to be imperative for the proletariat to not only 
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mobilize and ally with the peasantry, but also to establish its political programme 
(Engels, 1965, 1894; Lenin, 1960, 1966; Trotsky, 1969). Mao's use of peasant forces is 
regarded by many as reversing the precedence - that is mobilizing peasants to be the 
leading force of social transformation. However, the debate continues as to whether the 
Chinese peasantry was relied on as a vanguard or follower, with Mao's own writings 
increasingly suggest the latter as the Chinese revolution progressed (see Mao, 1971; 
Schram, 1969; Knight, 2004). 
The Chinese example, and a realization that peasant movements were threatening 
the balance of world order, caused a re-evaluation of peasant political power spearheaded 
by Moore's (1966) Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (Adas, 1985; Skocpol, 
1994). Whereas Kautsky (1988) held capitalism to be a conservatising influence on the 
peasantry, Moore (1966) contested that a transitional phase wherein the peasantry is 
simultaneously exploited by both capitalist and pre-capitalist relations radicalises the 
peasantry. In this context, the peasantry loses traditional security when exposed to 
agrarian capitalism and external markets, causing it to lose its stereotypical conservatism 
(Wolf, 1969a; Migdal, 1974). What is perhaps the most significant aspect of Moore's 
work is that it moved the Marxian analysis of social change away from privileging urban 
agents of change (industrial bourgeois and proletariat) and towards rural agents (peasant-
landlord class relations, rural-urban elite alliances). Moore also did not assume one route 
to modernisation and introduced a rural based schematic to understand political 
trajectories that, in direct contradiction to Marxian orthodoxy, considered a less 
commercialized agrarian economy to yield a more revolutionary peasantry.4 Moore 
4 In Moore's schematic, a strong bourgeoisie becomes politically aggressive and forms a bourgeois 
revolution which produces a bourgeois (liberal) democracy (e.g. England, France, and the United States); a 
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considered capitalist legal frameworks to weaken peasant solidarity (i.e. peasants become 
more individualized and internally competitive) and weak institutional links between 
upper classes and the peasantry to allow the peasantry more revolutionary autonomy. His 
theory, however, still rests peasant political action on that of bourgeois class action (or 
lack thereof). Not only do peasants still rely on a non-peasant leadership in Moore's 
formulation, but peasantries only become revolutionary after the national bourgeoisie is 
tamed, and only if the landed upper classes have yet to commercialize agrarian relations. 
Weak agrarian commercialization allows peasant social institutions to survive but unable 
to cope with modern stresses, thereby invoking a peasant revolution. This peasant 
revolution is mediated by rural class contradictions; meaning, the peasantry's political 
action and programme is divided along class lines and challenges agrarian social 
contradictions, such as peasant-landlord relations. 
A clear departure from earlier Marxists can be seen in the relevance of bourgeois 
revolution. Whereas Lenin (1960, 1966) and Trotsky (1969) considered peasant 
participation in a bourgeois revolution to be a precursor to poor peasants overthrowing 
rich peasants and subsequently demanding agrarian socialism, Moore clearly considered 
a bourgeois revolution to pre-emptively diminish the likelihood of a peasant revolution. 
However, Trotsky's theory of 'permanent revolution' suggested that a peasant-proletariat 
alliance can form a socialist revolution prior to the establishment of advanced capitalism. 
While some orthodox Marxists maintained that capitalist expansion must proceed 
to the point of creating a large landless peasantry before it can become a major political 
commercialized agrarian economy wherein the market represses labour leads to a weak peasantry, which 
may oppose authority but ultimately succumbs to a need for its political support, which in turn leads to a 
fascist (authoritarian) regime (e.g. Germany and Japan); and lastly, weak agrarian commercialization leads 
to a more revolutionary peasantry and in turn communist dictatorship (e.g. Russia and China). 
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force (eg. Paige, 1975; Petras, 1981), the idea that peasant social institutions could 
become revolutionary led Marxian theories of peasant political power to be challenged by 
neo-populist frameworks of subaltern studies and 'everyday forms of peasant resistance' 
(i.e. Scott, 1976, 1977, 1985, 1986; Kerkvliet, 1986). Much of the theoretical foundations 
of subaltern conceptualizations of peasant agency are prefigured in the works of Wolf 
(1969b) and Alavi (1973). Although Wolf dismissed smallholder agency5 he argued that 
only middle peasants have the capability to invoke and sustain class struggle, a thesis 
used by Alavi to suggest that peasant political agency "is mediated by primordial ties 
such as those of kinship." This led subaltern studies to reconceptualise the basis of 
peasant consciousness as socio-culturally differentiated from their oppressors (as opposed 
to socio-economically differentiated), which Guha (1982, 1983) held to be the only 
means by which the peasantry can be recast as agents of history (instead of subjects). 
Though Guha relied heavily on Marx he privileged the ideas of Gramsci, and 
while tribal and non-tribal peasant insurgencies were differentiated, intra-peasant class 
polarities and heterogeneous economic interests tended to be over-simplified. Indeed, in 
this redefinition of consciousness, counter-hegemonic peasant political participation is 
recast on the basis of cultural revitalisation and away from materiality; allegiances based 
on kin, clan, religion and ethnicity are considered more important than those based on 
class (Adas, 1979; 1985). Peasant agency was thought to be determined by the degree of 
cultural autonomy, meaning isolated peasantries with anti-state (bourgeois or not) pre-
capitalist values have the greatest agency in peasant resistance to capitalist attacks on 
traditional social relations (Scott, 1976; 1977). Marxists were accused of systemically 
distorting peasant protest towards state-centric directions, and new state formations based 
5 Which would later be championed by subaltern studies. 
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on class-based revolutions were accused of being more coercive and hegemonic than 
those they replaced (Scott, 1986). Instead, 'everyday forms of peasant resistance'6 
replaced what is characterised as a left-wing romanticism of national liberation wars as 
the primary means of peasant political agency (Scott, 1986; Adas, 1986), although such 
forms of resistance were conceded by subalternists to often precede openly 
confrontational peasant organizations (Kerkvliet, 2009; Scott, 1977). 
While some saw subaltern studies as distinguishing itself only through the 
rhetorical devices of populist idioms and the term 'subaltern' (Bayly, 1989) the 
difference between subaltern and Marxian conceptualizations of peasant agency or class 
power and political direction are paramount. Though Moore had already recast 
peasantries as capable drivers of social change and used the survival of traditional 
peasant institutions to do so, the peasantry's political programme was still considered 
materially inspired and state-driven. The focus of subaltern conceptualized peasant 
agency, meanwhile, is primarily cultural survival - i.e. the survival of peasant institutions 
which are the basis of Moore's idea of peasant political power but not the political end. It 
is the move away from a materially inspired peasant political agenda that has received the 
harshest criticisms from Marxist perspectives. 
A political agenda not directed towards state-capture but securing decentralized 
democracies leaves the state serving bourgeois interests, thereby allowing it to 
manipulate local government units through NGO-subcontracted market-based 
development projects, thereby failing to emancipate peasantries from capitalist structures 
6 Also referred to as 'Brechtian' forms of struggle, which can include foot-dragging, dissimulation, false-
compliance, pilfering, feigned ignorance, slander, arson, sabotage, and so on (Scott, 1986; see also 
Kerkvliet 1986, 2009). 'Brechtian' implies that change can be affected without the direct symbolism of 
action, and thus the arena in which politics is played out could be everywhere. Ergo, the privileging of 
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(Brass, 2002, 2005, 2007a, 2007b; Das, 2007; Amin 2001; White, 1986). Indeed, as will 
be further discussed in the proceeding sections of this literature review and illustrated in 
Chapter Three, the 'good' governance agenda has succeeded in manipulating what 
appears to decentralized democracies and local governments. Furthermore, some 
Marxists have gone so far as to accuse subalternists of rejecting "emancipation as the 
object and attainable end of historical transformation" altogether (Brass, 1991; Petras and 
Veltmeyer, 2001; Veltmeyer 1997, 2007) by thematically linking it to post-modernism 
via its replacement of class with culture as the impetus of action, and replacing 
'revolution as change' with 'resistance to change'. Similarly, the use of 'everyday forms 
of peasant resistance' has been criticized as recasting peasantries as dis-empowered 
actors unable to form an open political force (Walker, 2008), contrary to the subalternists 
claim of recasting peasants away from a passive victim persona. Finally, the utility of 
subaltern studies as an analytical tool is severely questioned by its false framework of 
homogenous peasant survival in the face of capitalist expansion (Putnaik, 1979), which 
imagines rural actors as uniformly oppressed by urban actors and obscures the prefigured 
political outcome of rural social movements (Brass, 1991, 1997). 
There is not a complete and absolute schism between Marxist and subaltern 
methods however. In particular, the use of 'everyday forms of peasant resistance' is 
enticing for studying peasant political power where the minimal political freedom to 
organize a movement or protest is lacking (Malseed, 2008). In other scenarios, some have 
argued 'everyday' resistance can predict a rise in organized peasant mobilization 
(Kerkvliet, 1993, 2009; Korovkin, 2000). Attempts at the latter have produced mixed 
recognizable organizations and movements in conventional studies is thought to miss much that is political 
(Kerkvliet, 2009). 
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results from a Marxist perspective. 'Everyday' resistance in Ecuador has been argued to 
have preceded an anti-socialist and non-class identified political organization (Korovkin, 
2000). Conversely, the framework has been used to suggest peasants in China are 
challenging a post-socialist development path (Walker, 2008). An 'everyday' framework 
has likewise been used to challenge a neo-populist perception that Vietnamese peasants 
desire a return to traditional socio-economic structures within the context of a richer 
modern world. The study concluded, however, that the framework "does not advance us 
very far in the analysis of power relations between the peasants and local and national 
power structures" (White, 1986). 
It is not easy to transplant this continuing debate onto the African context,7 but 
doing so provides a constructive basis for the theoretical understanding of peasant 
political power in Africa. Though the largest and perhaps most exploited (though highly 
differentiated) class in Africa, several historical obstacles to peasant political power must 
be acknowledged. Firstly, the impact of capitalism has been highly inconsistent due to 
unparalleled variableness of pre-capitalist structures.8 Secondly, the introduction of 
capitalist social relations has been a relatively recent phenomenon, leaving intact prior 
social networks which have the double impact of leaving the development of class 
consciousness murky and the peasants' most likely ally to be ruling elites from peasant 
lineage. Thirdly, the lack of landlords, quasi-feudal relations, and the use of local 
functionaries obscure and depersonalize the power behind oppression, creating an 
exploitative system and central state character difficult to comprehend from the peasant 
7 Especially given that only Adas (of the aforementioned) derived a considerable amount of his theoretical 
formulations from African examples. 
8 ex. the prevalence of feudal, pseudo-feudal, acephalous and communal societies in pre-colonial Uganda 
means the impact of capitalism is highly differentiated across geographic and tribal affiliations, diminishing 
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vantage point. This allows for political action to be easily confined to the local and for 
peasants to be incorporated into the political programme of others at higher levels. 
Finally, divide-and-conquer techniques have been used by both colonial and 
independence-era elites who present an imagery of the political-economic pie divided by 
ethnicity and not class (Saul, 1979: 299-309; Kasfir, 1984b; Mamdani, 1997: 213). 
Notwithstanding these obstacles, it would be a mistake to discount the political power 
contained within sub-Sahara African peasantries - regardless of for what and for whom it 
is mobilized. 
While African petit-bourgeoisies are often credited with leading the independence 
struggles (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 1987) - with some considering it as the only class with the 
necessary education to understand the concept of sovereignty (Emerson, 1962: 227) -
others argue they were forced into action by the pressures of peasant masses who were 
more revolutionary, more disdainful of the drawn-out bargaining process, and whose 
mobilization and participation at critical junctures forced the national leadership to act to 
retain power (Fanon, 1963: 92-102; Hodgkin, 1964: 61). Fanon argued that the bourgeois 
leaders preferred the long process of constitutional bargaining and were relatively docile 
when compared to the peasant appetite for radical liberation. Fanon also lambasted the 
rural proletariat for working for the colonialists whereas the peasantry - considered 
homogenous and classless with resilient pre-capitalist social relations - stubbornly 
defended tradition.9 
Fanon's depiction of peasant agency (that is classless, uniform, and defending 
the ability for peasants from different parts of the country to develop a shared understanding of the 
problems posed by capitalism. 
A case has also been made for labelling the urban proletariat as the vanguard in independence struggles; 
see Shivji (1975) and Panford (1994) for an analysis of this class' role in such struggles. 
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tradition), however, is highly contested and is argued to have been manipulated by 
nationalist leaders who tended to exaggerate mass participation, uniform consciousness 
and peasant homogeneity (Saul, 1973a). Van Walraven and Abbink (2003; see also 
Gewald, 2003) emphasize the importance of 1960s historiographic studies as allowing the 
bourgeois nationalist leadership to build a flawed imagery of African peasants solely 
resisting white colonialism while obscuring the degree to which African peasants were 
also challenging capitalist structures. Resistance of the everyday-form is thought to 
characterize common peasant resistance to colonialism, whereas overt struggles were a 
response to the more oppressive features of capitalism - such as land seizures and 
extreme threats to subsistence and peasant reproduction (Isaacman, 1993). However, the 
historiography of peasant resistance at the time was "marred by a teleology that 
constructed all African protest as leading inexorably to modern nationalism and 
decolonization" (van Walraven and Abbink, 2003:2) which diminished the extent to 
which capitalist structures were being challenged by peasants. The result has been a false 
decolonization - a mere 'Africanization' of colonial structures - and neo-colonial African 
states characterized to be dominated by a bourgeoisie with interests compatible with 
foreign capital, and a political demobilization and oppression of the peasantry (Saul, 
1973b; Nzongola-Ntalaja, 1987:49; Shivji, 1991a:33). This view, however, does tend to 
exaggerate the commonality of class interest between domestic bourgeois and 
international capital, to ignore new concerns of domestically emerging ruling classes, and 
to dismiss the "albeit limited political consciousness created by the nationalist struggle 
for independence" (Kasfir, 1984b:3). 
Regardless, one would be hard pressed to argue that peasants achieved political 
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emancipation in most nationalist struggles, and there thus was/is a needed second phase 
to liberation - the first being a nationalist struggle for independence with an impetus of 
ethnicity and populism; and the second being a social struggle against both international 
and domestic oppression based on an impetus of class (Cabral, 1972; Saul, 2005; 
Nzongola-Ntalaja, 1987; Vambe, 2005). At this particular conjuncture, an example of 
Zimbabwean peasant political power and its relation to the nationalist leadership pre- and 
post-independence provides a useful concretization of the argument that peasantries 
challenged the more oppressive features of capitalist structures during later-colonialism, 
but that a petty-bourgeois leadership emerged which offered only a very limited social 
transformation mandate, thus resulted in a second phase of peasant political protest. 
ZANU, dominated by an educated and elitist middle class, would emerge out of 
ZAPU - which had firm roots among peasants and migrant workers - to become the main 
nationalist organization and gain power upon independence (ZANU would later absorb 
ZAPU to become ZANU-PF)10 (Saul, 1979; Lee, 2003). Though supportive of national 
liberation, peasant participation in the struggle was based on a broader goal than ethnic 
emancipation and also demanded a transformation of village social structures to 
remediate intra-African inequalities in resistance to colonial relations. Regardless, 
ZANU-PF offered only a racialized nationalist programme and thus had to rely heavily 
on coercion to receive peasant support (Kriger, 2002:2-12), and causing ZANU-PF to 
rely on early resistance literature in an attempt to construct links to the ethnic resistance 
10 ZAPU (Zimbabwe African People's Union) was previously named the ANC (African National Congress) 
and the NDP (National Democratic Party) but was forced to change its name repeatedly as each preceding 
entity was banned by the Rhodesian government, a pattern which was prevalent, as we shall see, in Uganda 
as well. Countervailing this organizations was the Rhodesian Front (RF), a party of white hegemonists who 
after independence would go on to become the Republican Front and then Conservative Alliance of 
Zimbabwe before fizzling out when white-reserved seats in parliament were abolished with its members of 
parliament either joining ZANU or becoming independents. 
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against white occupation in the late 19 Century (van Walraven and Abbink:2003). Like 
the earlier struggles, the peasantry rejected white dominance, but now demanded 
democratic control over modern sources of wealth and not a return to traditional cultural 
values (Ranger, 1977). 
Ranger (1985) argues there were two-phases to this developed peasant 
consciousness. The first was a twofold 'peasant option' introduced by the colonialists: 
become forced labour, or effectively subsidize colonial oppression by growing crops for 
sale to metropole markets and subject to taxation. Opting against forced labour, most 
adopted the second option which necessitated several survival options: residency 
relocation, adoption of commercial crops, innovative labour divisions, and the use of new 
technologies. A second phase to peasant consciousness formation occurred in the 1930s-
40s when sharecropper and tenant peasants on white farms were forced onto already 
overcrowded African reserves. Faced with extinction as a class, the peasantry developed 
a radical consciousness but were disconnected from broader social movements and 
resorted to sporadic boycotts and general 'everyday-form of peasant resistance' tactics 
until the nationalist struggle emerged. 
From the outset, the 1980 ZANU government formation was viewed as a coercive 
party and violence continued until it absorbed ZAPU in 1988, becoming ZANU-PF 
(Kriger, 1992:30). Some scholars saw peasant disdain of ZANU as extending towards a 
'state' in general, depicting the state as a modernist intruder (Drinkwater, 1991; Munro, 
1995), but this view fails to acknowledge the modernist-structural peasant consciousness 
that emerged on the one hand, and the role of traditional chieftains in state-formation on 
the other (Alexander, 2006). Elite 'embourgeoisment' of the government led to the 
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embrace of neoliberalism in the late 1980s/early 1990s which combined with a slow pace 
of land redistribution would lead to several ZANU-PF polling defeats and a political and 
economic crises later in the decade (Saul, 2005:137; Dashwood, 2000:189; Lee and 
Colvard, 2003). 
Issues revolving around land use and allocation have been a central theme of 
peasant political protest. On the eve of independence, ZANU leaders compromised with 
white settlers and agreed to a market-based redistribution scheme but peasant protest 
forced further agrarian reform and a 1997 break from neoliberalism by listing of 1,471 
farms for expropriation (Moyo and Yeros, 2007). Saul (2005) considers this 'fast-track' 
land reform a ZANU-PF attempt to maintain power while disorganizing the landless 
peasantry who played an important role in their electoral defeats. The result has been 
what Moyo and Yeros (2007) consider to be an 'interrupted revolution' yet to be 
completed. 
Not all of the attempted 'second phase' to liberation movements have been 
successful however, including the one in Congo-Kinshasa" which sprang out with 
disaffection of political leaders who adopted extravagant lifestyles upon independence 
and failed to improve living conditions for the masses. A rising sentiment that 
"independence was meaningless without a better standard of living, greater civil liberties, 
and the promise of a better life for their children" (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 1987:92) provided 
the impetus for action, but the absence of revolutionary intellectuals,12 preparation, and 
internal ethnic divisionism within ranks led to a defeat against US-Belgium backed neo-
colonial forces comprised of white mercenaries, metropolitan troops, and anti-Castro 
11 Formerly Zaire and present day Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). 
12 Save for a few, including Ernesto 'Che' Guevara for a period. 
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Cubans organized by the CIA (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 1987). 
There are exceptions to the norm of political 'embourgeoisment' and 'false 
decolonization' that must also be considered, including Mozambique and Tanzania. 
Tanzania's pursuit of more structural transformations is often attributed to President 
Nyerere's leadership which formed a strong link with peasants and workers and 
encouraged active engagement and anti-racialist populism (Saul, 1973c; see numerous 
speeches by Nyerere, 1968). In Mozambique, racial politics plagued Frelimo13 at the 
beginning, but as an exiled force it had to acquire a deeper political programme to gain 
peasant support as it shifted operations across tribal territories. Mozambique's 'second 
phase' was actually a neo-colonial counter-revolution led by Renamo14 backed by 
neighbouring white-minority governments and notoriously using violent recruitment 
tactics to oppose the socialist Frelimo government (Saul, 1973b, 1979; Siebert, 2003). As 
noted above however, these were exceptions and the general norm of state formation after 
independence can be characterised as a centralized neo-colonial state structure from 
which the peasantry were politically marginalized. 
The rise of peasant movements in other continents has led to a renewed interest in 
the potential of peasant organizations to effect change. However, studies tend to neglect 
organizations not preoccupied with market-based development projects - effectively 
ignoring organizations with a class-informed identity (Moyo, 2002). The former, 
dominated by wealthy males, actively promote a bifurcated15 state system by exchanging 
13 Frente de Libertacao de Mozambique, or in English the Liberation Front of Mozambique. 
14 Resistencia National Moqambicana, or in English the Mozambican National Resistance. 
15 The concept of a 'bifurcated' state is quite similar to indirect rule and Mamdani's (1997) idea of 
'decentralized despotism' wherein urban citizenry rights are not expanded to rural spaces, leaving peasants 
under the rule of undemocratic traditional or customary authorities. The circumstance Moyo is referring to 
does not necessarily require the rule of traditional or customary authorities, but rather may be disguised by 
decentralized democratic processes dominated by rural elites, who then effectively endorse a clandestine 
23 
rural political leverage for materials and services from the central state (Moyo, 2002). 
Moyo's suggestion that peasant organizations infused with class consciousness are 
actively opposing neoliberalism but are simply not being studied is questioned by 
Bernstein however (2005), who instead argues that intergenerational and gender conflicts 
are more prevalent symptoms of failed agrarian development. 
It is true that fully fledged mass-based revolutions such as those attempted in 
present day Congo - and which Moyo seems to suggest are being reformed - are also 
exceptional, but this does not mean peasant politics is limited to the 'everyday forms' of 
hidden resistance. Rather, Seddon and Zeilig (2005) argue that nationalist struggles of the 
early national development era of class struggle and protest has been restructured by 
globalization. They contend that in the late 1970s and 1980s popular forces protested 
neoliberal reforms more than the legitimacy of the institutions behind such reforms, but 
go on to argue that protests began to involve "greater political orchestration" in the late 
1980s and 1990s and aimed themselves at governments as much as specific policies -
demanding greater democracy. Their article compares protest occurrence figures from the 
1980s to the early 1990s to suggest that thirty-five undemocratic regimes met their 
demise as a result of either massive protest or directly through the (re)introduction of 
elections in the early 1990s.'6 Keep in mind; these protests are coincided with a rise in 
development discourse fixated on 'good' governance. 
Such occurrences add weight to the view that innate peasant passivity is an out-
dated characterization. To placate the state and bourgeois classes as similarly passive 
continuance of indirect rule by exchanging the use of their local political leverage for material and service 
benefits from the central government. 
16 In the 1980s they calculate an average of twenty annual major political protests on the whole of sub-
Sahara Africa, this number increased to 86 major movements in 1991 alone (Seddon and Zeilig, 2005). 
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when faced with a peasantry exerting its class power is likewise flawed. Driven by rural 
resistance, the general trend of African states has been to grant limited democratic 
reforms at the local level through the creation of new institutions with the rhetoric of 
decentralization and participation as a means to empowerment, while in actuality further 
concentrating political power at the top in an attempt to muzzle dissenting voices 
(Mamdani, 1997:214); therein suggesting that participation may be considered as a tool 
in a larger struggle for social control. This argument provides the link between the two 
seemingly disparate bodies of literature of concern; that is, one concerning itself with the 
state-class nexus and theories of peasant struggle, and the other concerning itself with the 
neoliberal project of participation. 
To summarize, the literature reviewed shows that the infusion of capitalist 
structures and social relations have further economically differentiated the peasantry, 
forcing poor peasants to enter unequal socio-economic relations with dominant rural 
classes within their locality - not merely forcing peasantry writ large to enter unequal 
socio-economic relations with outside actors. Political compulsion has further 
differentiated the peasantry, and has facilitated the disappearance of an autonomous 
peasantry. Peasants, however, have been able to shed their politically passive image and 
have struggled to induce social change by resisting dominant class attempts to exert 
social control. Though dominant classes and political elites have tried to divide the 
peasantry along ethnic lines, appeal to populist sentiments and present an imagery of a 
peasantry demanding traditional/customary social renewal, many peasantries have 
demonstrated a power to induce more structural social change through democratic and 
economic gains. These gains have been limited, and somewhat reversible, because 
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political elites have responded by granting local democratic concessions while struggling 
to maintain political centrality and social control, which has been suggested to have the 
intent of placating the peasantry while confining the political role of poor peasants. 
The World Bank and the Politics of 'Good' Governance Discourse 
'Participation' as a concept has long been associated with social movements, but 
it is an ambiguous term that has also been utilized "as a means of maintaining rule, for 
neutralizing political opposition and for taxing the poorest" (Cornwall and Brock, 2005). 
At the end of the last section it was suggested that the concession of democratic 
decentralization in response to peasant protest was a means for political elites to obscure 
a highly centralized power structure while placating dissent with a degraded version of 
empowerment through local level participation. The next sections of this literature review 
will closely examine how this participatory framework has developed in the 'good' 
governance framework. Beforehand, though, the relationship between power and 
development discourse, policy and practice must be considered to understand how 
popular challenges to hegemony can be manipulated to justify and obscure continued 
elite dominance and undermine socially transformative emancipation. 
Dominant classes shape political discourse to legitimize and 'naturalize' their rule 
over subjects; dominant discourse, by way of ideological hegemony, co-opts as many 
oppositional discourses as it can (Moore, 1995). The discursive framing of democracy, 
and its subsidiary buzzwords such as participation and empowerment, has been 
(re)shaped to legitimize political dominance through the lens of'good' governance. Thus, 
while democratization in Sub-Saharan Africa is conventionally explained solely as the 
result of domestic actors drawing inspiration from international examples, Abrahamson 
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(2000) argues this narrative is used to downgrade globalized political interconnectedness 
(i.e., international pressure and political dependency) thereby dismissing the role of 
discourse in preserving Western/Northern hegemony. Mainstream discourse has long 
articulated an undeveloped South in need of Northern intervention so as to (re)model the 
South as mirrored to the North (Abrahamson, 2000); though framed as a reversal of this 
long established trend, the 'good' governance agenda and its discursive use of 
democratization, empowerment and participation continue the pattern. 
The interrelation of international bourgeois interests and development knowledge 
necessitate that discourse be understood in relation to extra-discursive factors. For 
example, and pertinent here, early modernization theories held liberal democracy to be 
nearly inevitable once 'traditional' societies reached a certain degree of 'modernity'. As 
the Cold War intensified and political freedom in developing countries was (re)imagined 
as a potential communist breeding ground, democratic desirability waned in 
modernization discourse and political order and stability were prioritized, consistent with 
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international bourgeois interests (Abrahamsen, 2000:26-27) 
Hastened by the demise of the Keynesian consensus in the 1970s and the ascent of 
neoliberalism in the in the 1980s development discourse took another decidedly anti-
democratic turn and gave way to monetarism. Political participation was regarded as 
insignificant or potentially detrimental to economic adjustment (Abrahamsen, 2000:29-
30). As the communist model of development collapsed in 1989, the World Bank 
reversed the anti-democratic trend in discourse with its 1989 report, Sub-Saharan Africa: 
From Crisis to Sustainable Growth, by (re)introducing governance as a primary concern 
17 See Almond and Coleman, 1960, as an example of the former; Huntington, 1968; and Coleman, 1965, 
are examples of the latter. 
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and suggesting the need for better, yet less, governance in Africa. However, as Moore's 
(1995) critical analysis informs us, this report promotes a discourse consistent with 
international bourgeois interests. It assumes poverty to be a factor of unutilized 
productive forces capable of being released not by (re)distributing resources but by 
deregulating resource access. Therefore, popular participation in designing development 
programs became a requirement to strip domestic elites of regulatory and policy 
functions, thereby creating an environment considered to be conducive to unrestricted 
productivity. The state's resources, now supposedly freed from domestic elites, were to 
be made available in the market, where all people are assumed to have equal access. 
Since states are considered incapable of creating such a market, International Financial 
Institutions (IFIs) would perform this role; but for Moore, this is a mere recalibration of 
colonialism hidden in the rhetorical devices of 'democracy'. The World Bank urged 
bilateral donors and other agencies to follow suit and support governments undertaking 
such reforms, thereby allowing neoliberal democracy, considered to be 'good' 
governance, to become a pre-condition of aid (Abrahamson, 2000). 
Given that the Cold War influenced discourse, it should not be surprising that its 
conclusion would likewise do so. While they were once somewhat politically important, 
African states became neither politically or economically important following the Cold 
War, and the 'good' governance agenda became what Abrahamsen (2000:36) describes 
as a "morally comfortable" way for Northern countries to justify Africa's miniscule share 
in global resources and subsequent poverty. In academic circles, the end of the Cold War 
legitimized the emergence of post-Marxist and post-modernist approaches accused of 
breeding apoliticism and negating emancipation as an end, effectively allowing 'critical' 
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scholars to embrace the 'good' governance agenda (Mohan, 1994; Mohan and Stokke, 
2000).18 Capitalist triumphalism reigned supreme in academia as alternatives were 
labeled as non-credible. Capitalism and bourgeois democracies were widely accepted as 
the only viable options (Abrahamsen, 2000:34).19 It should not be lost that this 
triumphalism is particularly erroneous given that it came on the heels of several capitalist 
development failures, most notably structural adjustment. Given such failures, 'good' 
governance discourse served not only to alienate the African state from society and 
delegitimize state-led development, but also to de-link the agenda from previous 
development failures (Abrahamsen, 2000:49).20 
Shivji (1991b:255) warned twenty years ago that the distinction between 
'popular' and 'liberal' democracy would become blurred in discourse with the 
disappearance of imperialism, class straggle, and class-state relations from the lexicon of 
academia. Without this distinction, Shivji cautions: 
"we are likely to get a celebration of the liberal triumph; jump 
indiscriminately on compradorial (for that is what liberalism 
degenerates into in most of our imperialist-dominated countries) 
bandwagons and confuse the long human struggle for democracy 
(equality) with its particular historical form - western liberalism 
(individualism)" (see also Saul, 1997a, 1997b).21 
Indeed, mainstream discourse presents democracy as an unchallenged and unproblematic, 
universally agreed upon concept (Moore, 1995; Abrahamsen, 2000:67) that has estranged 
It must be noted, however, that some were criticizing a movement in social theory away from class 
analytics and towards an assumption of an 'end in ideology' as far back as the mid-1960s (see Westergaard, 
1972). 
19 Fukuyama's (1989, 1992) 'end of history' thesis provides a good example of this assumption. 
20 Mohan (1994) also examined the relationship between power and knowledge and found that the Bank 
creates a consensus to justify neoliberalism by establishing research agendas and then basing their "policy 
discourse on this self-funded and 'objective' research." 
21 Mafeje's (2002) premonition has come true, as liberal democratic openings in Africa have degenerated 
into one-party dictatorships shrouded in the veneer of Western bureaucratic procedures. 
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itself from socio-economic equality objectives. Abrahamsen (2000) argues that 
democracy is framed in 'good' governance discourse in a way that presents it as 
distinctive from the state's socio-economic roles - thereby obscuring the distinction 
between democracy and neoliberalism itself. The detachment of democratic functions 
from any economic role22 indirectly reaffirms a-priori social structures; i.e. current 
discourse promotes a conceptualization of democracy that indirectly promotes elite 
privilege even though popular demands for democratization in Africa are rooted in 
economic grievances.23 By not considering the role of imperialism and class struggle, the 
current debate on African democracy no longer has to concern itself with debates on 
political-economic alternatives, meaning it no longer has to conceptualize democracy as 
"the route to any kind of genuine empowerment" (Saul, 2005:61). Ergo, it becomes 
possible to allow participation in democratic procedures without concern that political-
economic dominance will be threatened. Indeed, as Schmitz (1995) noticed, "[w]hat is 
remarkable about much of the fashionable discourses on 'participatory development' are 
the extent to which they evade the actual relations of power which keep people poor and 
disempowered." 
Originally restricted by bourgeois social thought to those possessing 'reason' and 
'rationality' - thereby excluding peasants, women, the proletariat, and other socially 
marginalized groups - democracy has since been extended as a universal right as such 
groups struggled for participatory inclusion. Yet, the wider democratic rights have spread 
the shallower these rights have become (Amin, 2001). As democratic procedures at the 
national level have been reduced to the selection from a pool of elites to manage a 
22 Or as Amin (2001) would argue, the separation of political and economic domains. 
23 As discussed in the first section of the previous section of this chapter. 
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predetermined economic system, 'good' governance discourse has opted to emphasize 
local level participation (Mohan, 1994). The narrative produces an imagery wherein local 
communities are now 'empowered' to participate in local poverty reduction strategies, 
but empowerment to participate in broader strategy formation - i.e. addressing the 
international political economy of poverty - is absent from consideration of what it 
means to be 'empowered'. 
Participation, as a component of democracy, likewise has a long history of debate 
and contestation. There is no definitive origin to the debate on participation in the public 
realm as current discourse offers a reinterpretation and co-optation of an old concept. One 
could likely find remnants of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle in contemporary discourse on 
participation. In the realm of political science one could just as easily begin with 
Rousseau's 1762 treatise The Social Contract which argues that participation is not 
merely an adjunct to institutional arrangements but the basis of popular sovereignty 
which requires political equality; or one could start from Schumpeter's (1943:258-61, 
270) more recent rejection of participation in any meaningful role, instead arguing that it 
is necessary only in the minimal sense necessary to sustain electoral mechanisms and 
suggesting that the masses are not rational enough play a greater political role. In 
development discourse, however, one tends to begin discussions on participation as if 
Friere's 1970 Pedagogy of the Oppressed was the first to make mention of it, even 
though Friere's conceptualization of participation has been extensively co-opted. 
Friere stressed repeatedly that true emancipation cannot come by chance or from 
bourgeois benevolence, but that it can only come from the praxis of the poor. This praxis, 
the combination of theory and practice, requires the oppressed to critically understand the 
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nature of their oppression, for "[t]he conviction of the oppressed that they must fight for 
their liberation is not a gift bestowed by the revolutionary leadership, but the result of 
their own conscientization [the building of social consciousness]" (Friere, 1993:49, 
emphasis in original). Only after this process, Friere (1993:51) asserted, will "the 
presence of the oppressed in the struggle for their liberation be what it should be: not 
pseudo-participation, but committed involvement." While supporting participatory 
governance, Friere considered its arrival to depend on the mobilization of peasant and 
proletariat classes in conflict against authoritative political and economic structures 
(Thomas, 1999). However, similar to concepts of democracy, participation has been 
subject to a discursive re framing that permits its manipulation by powerful actors to strip 
its meaning and practice of any threat to hegemony. 
The World Bank's usage of the term demonstrates the extent to which 
'participation' has been d estranged from its Frierian conceptualization. In the forward to 
the Bank's (1996) Participation Sourcebook, then new World Bank President James 
Wolfensen calls participation the Bank's new "way of doing business;" a model wherein 
'sponsors' (domestic governments) and 'designers' (the Bank's task manager) collaborate 
with 'stakeholders' (the participants) to develop project strategies and tactics. The term 
'stakeholder' is preferred to the more exclusive 'participant', because the Bank is 
including not just the poor and disadvantaged under this rubric but also NGOs, the 
private sector, and even the Bank's own staff and shareholders. Furthermore, 
participation in development projects is habitually relegated to phases that continue to 
allow non-participants to identify what development 'needs' are to be targeted; meaning 
non-participants effectively decide what objectives people are to be 'empowered' to 
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participate in. 
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39% 
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(Extracted from World Bank, 2001) 
With mounting self-collected evidence suggesting that weaker social groups were 
often excluded from project-based participation, the Bank became more focused not on 
correcting this but rather concentrating on what it refers to as 'citizen participation' to 
promote broader inclusion, which entails political decentralization and participatory local 
governance (Pozzoni and Kumar, 2005). Although World Bank analysts Pozzoni and 
Kumar (2005) acknowledge "that weaker groups are likely to exert only minimal 
influence, if at all, on the decision-making process" in both project and citizen based 
participation, the latter is still considered better at including groups hitherto excluded on 
grounds of gender, caste, and race. That class does not appear on this list is not a mistake 
or an assumption that weaker classes are not marginalized, but rather that participatory 
local governance is thought only to occur in classless societies. As Shah (1998), another 
Bank analyst, wrote: "[t]he success of decentralization as a tool for citizen participation, 
however, critically depends upon a class-less society." Where what the Bank terms as 
'wealth heterogeneity' does exist, nonetheless, elites are said to be better educated and 
are accordingly regarded as legitimate representatives of their communities, ergo "the 
issue should not be how to avoid elite domination, but how to ensure that the power and 
energy of the elites serves the interest of the poor" (Pozzoni and Kumar, 2005). Though 
the Bank acknowledges that elites may exist, and that these elites attain higher degrees of 
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wealth and education, there is no consideration as to whether such discrepancies are a 
result of class-based social divisions. 
Bringing community level participatory process to the national level is considered 
to be of secondary importance (Blackburn et al, 2000) as states are regarded as too large 
to address 'small things' and too small to address 'big things' (Shah, 1998). Thus, it is 
seen as imperative that states decentralize responsibilities over non-descript 'small 
things' while allowing the World Bank Group to handle 'big things'; because, in the 
Banks view, "the public sector is dysfunctional and does not deliver much in developing 
countries" (Shaw, 1998). Indeed, state governments are considered to be the biggest 
obstacle to participation and are accused of scepticism towards, and of rarely providing, 
long-term support to participatory processes (World Bank, 2001). State 'ownership' of 
participation is regarded to come only from sharing the significant costs of participatory 
processes, such as labour, materials, time and money, with local communities. The 
Bank's conceptualization of participation, therefore, explicitly involves stripping the state 
of its political-economic roles and reassigning these roles to local elites and IFIs. 
Far from challenging oppressive social structures, participation now - as 
conducted through the neoliberal 'good' governance project - serves to reinforce elite 
dominance. The co-optation of Frierian participation as a concept has been made possible 
through participatory methodological mainstreaming - which have risen to replace more 
conventional political processes - that have shifted the intent of participation away from 
challenging oppressive social structures. 
Generally regarded as the first methodology to be inspired directly by Friere, 
Participatory Action Research (PAR) used the ideas of critical reflection, dialogue and 
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participatory research to build social awareness and confidence among oppressed peoples 
with the aim of empowering action and social change (Mclntyre, 2008). According to 
Chambers (1992, 1994, 1997), however, this emphasis on empowering the poor to take 
political action against established interests limited the spread of PAR. Therefore, 
Chambers engineered a shift in participatory approaches away from challenging broader 
social structures by reducing participation to a project-level focus. Abandoning social 
change through political action as the impetus of participation allowed Participatory 
Rural Appraisal (PRA) to become the most widely used method of participation in the 
international development industry (Blackburn et al, 2000) - a framework self-
acknowledged to be influenced more by the discursive language of PAR rather than its 
methods (Chambers, 1992, 1994, 2008). Indeed, in its approach to project-oriented 
development, PRA is more influenced by the non-participatory Rapid Rural Appraisal 
(RRA).24 
Chambers claims that to reduce poverty the basis of knowledge itself needs to be 
tackled, and not the basis of political-economic structures. As will be demonstrated, 
however, by assuming that the rise of participatory approaches represents a paradigmatic 
shift in development theory and practice, proponents of the participatory methods 
Chambers popularized fail to account for the political use of the very alternative 
knowledge system they endorse. 
Chambers (1983) accuses modern scientific knowledge of ignoring the organic 
and oft superior knowledge of rural peoples, and therefore "[w]hatever is important to the 
24 The core principles of RRA include triangulation, exploratory and highly interactive research, rapid and 
progressive learning, substantial use of indigenous knowledge, interdisciplinary and team approaches, as 
well as a flexibility and use of 'conscious' knowledge (Grandstaff et al, 1987; Gibbs, 1987). RRA's 
approaches to agroecosystem analysis, applied anthropology, and field research on farming systems have 
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poor tends to be neglected by the non-poor" (Chambers, 1988:2). As a result of spatial, 
project and personal, seasonal, diplomatic, and professional biases, Chambers (1983, 
1987, 1992, 1994, 1997, 2008) argues that rural poverty remains effectively unobserved 
by conventional research methods. Given that "professionalism creates and sustains its 
own reality" (Chambers, 1997:33), it is the development professional (ranging from 
foreign radical activists in remote villages to the President of the World Bank) that need 
to change their knowledge system. Power is considered a disability in terms of 
knowledge in the development industry, as it leads to self-deception. Chambers (1997) 
reasons that powerful actors impose their oft erroneous knowledge systems, and in so 
doing, learning is impeded by denial of- and distance from - realities, a pattern of victim 
blaming, and personal dominance. Hence, PRA is introduced as a means to correct the 
broken knowledge system by allowing the poor to share and analyze their own reality. 
Instead of transforming or challenging broader socio-economic structures, then, 
participation needs to open space to bring the poor into policy formation processes. This 
space is thought to be opened by conducting Participatory Poverty Assessments (PPA) 
alongside conventional World Bank poverty assessments - space ostensibly opened 
because previous poverty measures were considered faulty without the participation of 
the poor in the research process (Holland and Blackburn, 1998). In 1992 the World Bank 
indicated they would begin using PPAs, which rely on either PRA or non-participatory 
RRA methods. Analytically, PPAs are focused on household consumption and income 
data - not structural causes of poverty - and are performed by social scientists hired by 
the World Bank. That the "[objectives, methodology, and research agenda are 
established by the task manager [Bank staffer] with the social scientist, and institutions 
strongly influences the methods of PRA (Chambers, 1992, 1997, 2008). 
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and researchers within the country are identified [by the Bank] for potential 
collaboration" (Holland and Blackburn, 1998:3) is not seen as problematic, because 
again, the problem of poverty has shifted from structural causal factors to lack of 
adequate knowledge. The only power imbalance recognized is that the aggregation of 
results and relevancy of findings on policy is determined "outside the control of local 
participants" (Norton, 1998:180). That the World Bank establishes the research 
objectives - which noticeably concentrate on purchasing power - is not problematized. 
As for the actual influence of participatory processes on policy, the Bank claims it is 
difficult to ascertain and suggests that instances of low policy impact can be explained by 
'host' governments not placing a high priority on poverty reduction, or on "a lack of trust 
between the government and the World Bank" (Robb, 1998:135). 
The fact that it is up to dominant classes to 'empower' the rural poor - as only the 
upper classes have the necessary power and resources to do so (Chambers, 1983) - is not 
considered a logical contradiction, as "[a]ltruism is a fact of human behavior, and can be 
chosen" (Chambers, 1997:13). Thus, for Chambers (2008:180), the only factor that limits 
the potential of participatory methodologies includes institutional and socialized biases 
towards didactic teaching methods in universities and powerful institutions; a lack of 
suitable facilitators; and a vulnerability to project funding withdrawals. A more plausible 
limitation of Chambers' reconceptualization of participation is that it reinterprets the 
concept away from a means of challenging powerful actors and structures so as to change 
them and alter the balance of power, towards 'participation' as an improved research 
process by which those powerful actors are better able to implement their development 
agenda. 
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PRSPs and Participation 
In December of 1999 the World Bank Group announced that it had approved the 
implementation of Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) as a new framework for 
the delivery of aid and reduction of poverty. The move was touted as a significant 
departure from previously dictated policies for its 'participatory' components (Cheru, 
2006). PRSPs have since become the central vehicle for delivering aid from the Bank and 
IMF and it is expected that other donor agencies (bilateral and multilateral) will follow 
suit (Lazarus, 2008). Initially, Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPCs) were required to 
sign a PRSP as a condition for debt reduction, but the program has since expanded to 
non-HIPCs with over seventy signatories, many now producing second generation 
papers. Participation, conveyed by the Bank to be an integral feature of PRSPs, is 
considered to be a means of national dialogue wherein "stakeholders influence and share 
control over priority setting, policy making, resource allocation, and/or project 
implementation (World Bank, 2007). While some applaud the engagement of civil 
society in policy debates, the renewed focus on poverty, and the "harmonisation of donor 
alignments" (Driscoll and Evans, 2005), others are not appeased. The common concerns 
of PRSP opponents are threefold: one, macroeconomic policies remain non-negotiable in 
that they must continue to be neoliberal in character; two, the depth of participation is 
shallow and breadth narrowly focused, with an over-emphasis on the 'process' rather 
than the 'principle' of participation; and three, national ownership and authorship is 
dubious as "negotiations over key concessional loans remain the private domain" 
(Lazarus, 2008). 
The mainstream response has been technocratic and dismissive of the limitations 
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of the newly conceptualized participation, while presenting shallow prescriptions to 
improve only the process and not utility of participation. The weakness of the 
participatory process is attributed to the inexperience of stakeholders and a lack of 
resources and skill to actively engage in (Driscoll and Evans, 2005). Driscoll and Evans 
(2005) blame sector ministers in host-governments for limiting participatory processes 
for fear of losing control, and then contradict themselves by claiming participatory 
processes in host-countries fail due to institutional weakness. In the African context, 
Hanley (2002) contends one should not be surprised at the weakness of participatory 
processes in that governments need longer time-frames to acclimatize to the paradigmatic 
shift due to the poor state of social sciences on the continent. Perhaps taking note of this 
type of argument, the World Bank (2002b) has only conceded that compromised 
participatory processes result from overly-ambitious timelines for completion. To 
improve participatory processes, the Bank (2000, 2002a) argues it is necessary to 
institutionalize participation via participatory local governance; even going so far as to 
suggest that participatory local governance can serve as a substitute for dysfunctional 
parliaments. 
Such responses to the failures of PRSPs have been criticized for several reasons: 
first, the democratic deficiencies of participatory processes, such as persistent social 
exclusion and non-representative use of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), are 
overlooked; secondly, it is overly simplistic to assume an externally imposed alternative 
can successfully replace internal, 'dysfunctional' institutions; and thirdly, the mainstream 
responses ignore empirical evidence that suggests the formal institutionalization of 
participatory processes embodied in the PRSP formula is insignificant "where the rule of 
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law is often subordinate to the logic of informal institutions" (Lazarus, 2008). In short, 
mainstream responses to the emerging criticisms of PRSPs are technocratic, shallow, and 
dismissive. 
Despite these shortcomings, many have attempted to salvage the project by 
offering reforms. Ideas offered by reformists often centre around the apparent neglect of 
domestic political considerations. It is argued that a divide has been created between the 
conventional representative process and the consultative process of PRSPs. At the 
national level, parliaments and other elected politicians have been excluded (Cheru, 
2006). At the local level, government units are not utilized in the process - despite Bank 
championing of local governments. Rather, separate forums are created, producing "a 
quagmire in not using formal institutions because they do not function properly, but then 
subsequently undermining their development by sidestepping them" (Whitfield, 2005). 
Piron and Evans (2004) assert that political processes are ignored in host countries; most 
observably the electoral cycles in many recipient countries impede either the formulation 
or implementation of PRSP processes. Reformers tend to assume that the political 
implications of PRSPs are not discussed in the technocratic circles of the World Bank 
(Piron and Evans, 2004; see also Morrison and Singer, 2007). A more critical 
perspective, such as that taken in this thesis, would not assume the sidestepping of 
existing political processes to be accidental. It is possible to assert that the supposed 
consultation processes required by PRSPs brings in selective elements of 'civil society' 
rather than the elected political power brokers who already have mechanisms in place to 
perform such processes, represents an attempt by the Bank to create another political 
process/structure that does not reflect any real kind of democratic political power base 
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that can then be more easily manipulated. Rather, for those seeking to salvage PRSPs, the 
disappointed and repetitive policies brought forth are reduced to a problem of 
participatory processes. It is argued that the different purposes meant to be fulfilled by 
participation compromise its influence, and that those who wield elected power merely 
refuse to 'buy-in' (Booth, 2005; Booth et al, 2006). 
Various critical, Marxist, and neo-Marxist perspectives, in contrast, argue that the 
World Bank's previous efforts to enforce neoliberalism have been thwarted by social 
factors below the state - i.e. peasant resistance - and driven by such an understanding, 
accuses the Bank of trying to circumvent the state. The participatory process thus 
becomes a tool to manufacture consent by transforming the domestic objectives of a 
variety of actors to allow the Bank and IMF to maintain traditional lending patterns while 
publicly positioning themselves away from the immensely unpopular era of structural 
adjustment (Fraser, 2005; Whitfield, 2005; Dijkstra, 2005). Participation in the PRSP 
process is recognized as a technology of social control to suppress protest and absorb 
counter-hegemonic ideas and energies through lengthy processes and false democratic 
promises, thereby diminishing the potential of radical transformation (Ruckert, 2007; 
Lazarus, 2008; Craig and Porter, 2006; Fraser, 2005; Dijkstra, 2005). The assertion that 
counter-hegemonic groups are being absorbed and neutralized by PRSP processes can be 
questioned, however, because groups missing from the PRSP process include not only 
elected officials, but also trade unions, small rural and local NGOs with close 
connections to poor peasants, feminist organizations, and other marginalized civil society 
groups (Stewart and Wang, 2003). As such, it is the professionalized middle class in 
client countries that dominate the 'civil society' elements invited to participation in the 
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PRSP process; the middle class is reported to have established themselves in national-
level CSOs to partake in such processes not to represent the poor per se, but to access 
funding (Gould, 2005; Dijsktra, 2005). This is not to suggest that 'good' governance 
participation lacks an element of social control, but rather that counter-hegemonic energy 
has not absorbed and neutralized by the PRSP process itself. As will be demonstrated in 
the conclusion of this thesis, theoretically developed in the literature review, brought 
forth in the thesis statement and demonstrated in chapter three, attempts to achieve social 
control is part of the 'good' government framework of participation as a whole. 
The technocratic facade of participation abets global capital by undermining 
domestic accountability and weakening formal elected legislatures and national 
governments (Dijkstra, 2005; Whitfield, 2005; Morrison and Singer, 2007). As Dijkstra 
explains: 
"[a]s long as one talks about 'participation' by 'civil society', it is not 
necessary to define or formalise the actual influence of this 
participation process, which means that donors can insert their 
priorities into the strategy. As soon as parliaments are involved, donor 
influence may be curtailed" (Dijkstra, 2005). 
Thus, 'ownership' of the PRSP process cannot possibly rest with host-countries, which is 
further compounded by the fact that the boards of the World Bank and IMF ultimately 
have power to reject or endorse any PRSP (Kamruzzaman, 2009). We thus witness 
democratically elected representatives being largely shutout of perhaps the most 
important 'domestic' development strategy of their respective countries. Therefore, while 
supposedly strengthening democracy, what we see in 'good' governance defined 
participation is what appears to be the replacement of domestic bourgeois (liberal) 
democracy with an international bourgeois dictatorship. 
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Participation as Tyranny 
The use of buzzwords such as 'participation', 'empowerment', and 'poverty 
reduction' frame development objectives as an apparent ideological confluence of no-
nonsense pragmatism and unimpeachable moral authority. In truth, "the terms we use are 
never neutral" (Cornwall and Brock, 2005). Participation has been divorced from its 
Frierian meaning of a tool for the oppressed to transform social relation and "has been 
translated into a managerial exercise based on 'toolboxes' and procedures" (Cleaver, 
2001). The term is popular among governments and IFIs because it remains attractive as 
a populist slogan but is no longer a threat to established interests (Rahnema, 1995). 
Local government units are not only highly susceptible to elite capture, as 
indicated above, but can also be used to exert social control at a more local level (Jutting 
et al, 2005; Robinson, 2003; Veltmeyer, 2007). While there is no systematic evidence 
that decentralization leads to poverty reduction, there is evidence that it acts as a conduit 
for dispersing the burden of social programming costs from central governments onto 
localities, thereby allowing capital to reap the benefits of participation while minimizing 
its costs (Robinson, 2003; Mosse, 2001). Unable to afford such programming, local 
governments depend on NGOs, who - disconnected from their radical origins and 
insensitive to power relations - have become a 'Trojan horse' for global neoliberalism 
through their use as 'apolitical' participatory project facilitators (Wallace, 2004). Project 
oriented participation has itself been reduced to a technicality. The degree of participation 
in the most significant component in planning processes - that of establishing objectives 
- is open to interpretation, allowing it to become a tool in the political arena of powerful 
actors (Christoplos, 1995; White, 1996; Ye Jingzhong, 2008; Rahnema, 1995). 
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Participation has been relegated to the design or implementation of pre-established 
objectives,25 meaning it would be more accurately regarded as the pseudo-participation 
Friere warned of. 
The idea that participation celebrates the rise of local knowledge is a dubious 
juxtaposition. While Chambers claims that participation corrects the knowledge 
imbalance in development practice by replacing institutional with local knowledge, local 
power dynamics which privilege the use of elite knowledge are ignored (Kothari, 2001; 
Mosse, 2001). Communities26 are presented as homogenous entities, which corresponds 
to an imagery of identical needs and interests (Bhattacharyya, 2007), allowing wealthy 
elites to theoretically represent the interests of the poor. Communities, however, are not 
homogenous entities and structural impediments prevent certain groups from 
'participating' relative to others. Thus "power is involved in the construction of interests 
themselves" (White, 1996; see also Kwok-Fu Wong, 2003). Variables such as age, 
gender, religion and ethnicity, as well as socio-economic structures such as class, can 
limit one's ability to participate in the project related meetings or local governance units 
that generate 'community' knowledge. 
Roughly one decade ago Cooke and Kothari (2001) posed the question: 
"Participation: the new Tyranny?" Through discursive manipulation 'participation', in a 
rather Orwellian sense, has come to mean the opposite of its traditional connotation. The 
traditional usage of participation as a means of transforming social structures is 
symbolized more by the popular demands peasants have made for the democratic right to 
change socio-economic structures, than the tyrannical model of 'democracy' the 'good' 
25 See table extracted from World Bank (2001) on page 32. 
26 Even the term 'community' has some limitations and problems associated with a failure to comprehend 
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governance agenda now enforces. The 'good' governance agenda reinforces a priori 
structures by detaching democracy from the socio-economic realm and truncating its 
capacity to debate alternative models of development. Through participation, an attempt 
has been made to create alternative political processes that exclude democratically 
elected representatives and replace them with a restrictive use of elite-saturated civil 
society agents and local governments. Far from being empowered, the participatory 
governance framework shuts the rural poor out of national, and local, development policy 
dialogues - leaving them no democratic body whose power has not been stripped away 
by 'good' governance. With this in mind, it must be seriously considered whether 
participation is a tool of international and domestic bourgeois struggle to socially control 
the poor peasantry; in other words, the question of whether participation is the new 
tyranny must be answered. 
Thesis Statement 
As a reminder, the central question guiding this thesis asks: what is the nature of 
the relationship between 'good' governance defined participation and the struggle for 
social control in Uganda? The hypothesis strongly argues that the neoliberal inspired 
'good' governance model of participation in Uganda reinforces the dominant position of 
elite classes, domestic and international, over poor peasants. It is argued that participation 
as conducted under the rubric provided by the 'good' governance agenda in Uganda, 
under the current regime and World Bank influenced period, is a form of tyranny rather 
than a means of socially transformative empowerment. 
The participatory model of governance deployed in Uganda has created an 
alternative political process outside conventional political modalities that possesses the 
social differentiation. 
45 
discursive lure of democracy but shuts the poor peasantry out of development policy 
dialogue. Locally, poor peasants are ill-represented in government units, which are 
instead dominated by local elites. The local government units, nonetheless, are 
themselves shutout of development policy circles and are used as a means of localizing 
social control to re-enforce externally designed agendas while forcefully extracting taxes 
and abetting exploitative economic relations. Unable to finance the social programs 
which have been decentralized, local government units depend on Civil Society 
Organizations (CSOs) which are selectively chosen to participate in policy formation in a 
manner which excludes the poor and those with non-conforming perspectives, thereby 
circumventing conventional political processes and excluding elected politicians. The 
circumvention of conventional political processes has permitted the establishment of an 
obscured international bourgeois dictatorship shrouded with the veneer of democratic 
populism, which reinforces the domestic dominance of elite classes over poor peasants in 
Uganda. 
As a class, poor peasants in Uganda have historically not been granted the same 
citizenry rights of more elite classes, and have been subject to political and economic 
dominance. However, the poor peasantry is not devoid of political power. It has the 
ability, and has demonstrated this ability, to shape the very social structures that confine 
them by struggling for land and democratic rights during colonialism and by restructuring 
village social relations during the 'Bush War' which brought the current regime to power, 
thereby challenging elite class dominance and resisting control. Political elites in Uganda, 
supported by the neoliberal 'good' governance agenda, have responded by making 
limited local democratic concessions, such as elected local councils, while maintaining 
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political centrality and policy processes dominated by an international bourgeoisie by 
way of World Bank influence. 
The introduction of participatory governance structures in Uganda denies the 
social basis of class and assumes uniform economic interests, and can therefore only be 
deemed successful by likewise denying the social basis of class. Effectively depoliticized 
by discourse manipulation, participation today represents a false, ostensibly apolitical, 
regime of empowerment. This can be observed in Uganda's new governance model. In 
many ways, it has been designed to mute and neutralize the power of poor peasants, not 
to empower them. Participation in Uganda has been a top-down response to bottom-up 
insurrection, and has been used to entrench elite dominance while obscuring it with the 
creation of institutions that appear participatory and empowering in rhetoric only. 
Methodology 
Several data sets are needed to support- this thesis statement. These data sets can 
be divided into historical information and information concerning the usage of 
participation in the current 'good' governance model deployed in Uganda, from the mid-
to-late 1990s to the present. Historical information is needed on the nature of social 
relations in colonial and post-colonial Uganda with specific reference to modalities of 
social control over poor peasants; this includes the nature of political compulsion, socio-
economic differentiation, and peasant subjugation to local class dominance. We are also 
looking for occurrences of peasant resistance to social control, and how peasants have 
been able to challenge social contradictions and shape the very structures that confine 
them. Furthermore, we need to know how political elites have historically responded to 
the challenge posed by peasants to social control. Concerning the current era, we need to 
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know the nature of participation in national electoral mechanisms and we need to know 
what space, if any, is available for poor peasants to participate in national and local 
policy dialogue; the modalities of alternative political processes created by the Poverty 
Eradication Action Plan (PEAP) and 'good' governance restructuring; the role of local 
government within the 'good' governance model of participation; and lastly, we need to 
know the role of civil society plays within the 'good' governance framework of 
participation. In regards to the PEAP, local governments, and civil society, we need to 
know the nature of participation within their roles and how this impacts the struggle for 
social control, and we know the effects of this participation on the poor peasantry. 
A qualitative methodology will be used to perform this research and analyze the 
materials. According to Newman (2006:149), in its emphasis on developing insights 
qualitative research concerns itself with the incalculable texture and richness of raw data; 
or as Berg (2004) alludes to, the "essence and ambiance" of concepts, definitions, 
characterizations, et cetera. As part of a qualitative methodology, this project has 
employed the use of a case study, which may be defined as an "in-depth multifaceted 
investigation, using qualitative research methods, of a single social phenomenon" (Orun 
et al, 1991:2), which in this case is 'participation'. Sjoberg et al (1991:50) assert that only 
in-depth case studies can examine both the truly powerful and truly disadvantaged, as 
required by this study; non-case study approaches, in particular social scientists who 
attempt to deploy natural science methods such as social surveys (claiming then to make 
accurate broad generalizations that would supersede case studies) miss the very powerful 
and very marginalized. Wright's Classes (1985), for example, though a self-proclaimed 
Marxian study, missed the most economically and politically powerful as well as the 
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homeless and many of those living in ghettos (Sjoberg et al, 1991). 
Uganda presents us with a particularly useful case study of participation as part of 
the 'good' governance agenda. Uganda's political-economic history closely resembles 
patterns consistent with the general Sub-Sahara African experience. It was the first PRSP 
signatory in 2000, and its PEAP (1997) and implementation of participation are 
considered to be a model for other countries. By virtue of such status, there are many 
reports and studies on the patterns of 'good' governance participation, the impact its had 
on the poor peasantry, and relationship between poor peasants and domestic elites in 
Uganda, which can be used in this study. These studies, however, tend to look at one 
particular feature of participation, such as local government units, civil society 
organizations, or Uganda's PEAP. Many studies, therefore, miss the complex relations 
between the different facets of institutionalized participation and the patterns that become 
evident when examining the interconnections between these features, thereby leaving a 
knowledge gap which this study seeks to fill. 
The collection of materials was drawn primarily from reputable academic journals 
(such as The Journal of Peasant Studies, Review of African Political Economy, World 
Development, et cetera), University Press publications, and highly regarded publishers 
(such as MacMillan Press, Zed Books, and Fountain Publishers in Kampala), Ugandan 
government documents, civil society reports, or online publications (World Bank 
documents, and in some instances, newspapers). One brief trip to Kampala (for the month 
of June, 2010) was undertaken for the purpose of collecting written reports, government 
and CSO documents, academic conference proceedings, and occasional papers from the 
Centre for Basic Research. This trip also allowed for meetings with Ugandan academics 
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to present ideas and arguments, and informal conversations with students and Kampalans 
with peasant families about rural political life, to get a feeling for the political climate 
ahead of the 2011 general elections, and to seek autonomous peasant organizations or 
movements engaging in politics (a quest which, for the most part, failed). 
To interpret data, this project uses a Marxian interpretative paradigm, which like 
feminist, ethnic and cultural studies, privileges a materialist-realist ontology which 
considers material differences between groups to be affected by social relations, and 
therefore "[ejmpirical materials and theoretical arguments are evaluated in terms of their 
emancipatory implications" (Denzin and Lincoln, 1998:27-8). Marx's central scientific 
goals were to provide an empirical understanding of market-based economic institutions, 
the social implications of these institutions, and to shed light on the historical processes 
that have given rise to these institutions in capitalist settings (Little, 1986). Though 
Marx's methodological approach included issues of class, struggle, and labour power as 
agents of history shaping base and superstructure, there is no monolithic Marxist 
methodological technique. Nonetheless, Marxist studies always use an approach which is 
materialist (i.e, not subjective), refers to class struggle, and is dialectical.27 For this study, 
such an approach implies that peasants, and bourgeois classes, are acting on the basis 
material interests and not cultural biases. It also implies a dialectical relationship between 
classes, wherein contradictions are continually challenged and new social orders are 
continually being shaped through class struggle. With that said, this study will pay 
particular attention to how social contradictions and class struggle have shaped 
'participation', and in turn, will examine how 'participation' itself breeds social 
contradictions. 
50 
Since Marx, Marxist methodologies have been divided by "an epistemology that 
embraces its own historicity and one that claims to portray a reality outside itself 
(MacKinnon, 1982). In the former stream, all thought is considered ideological (i.e., 
based on class interests) and is well represented by Lukacs (1971:47) who considered the 
project of research to be the creation of "a theory of theory and a consciousness of 
consciousness." In the second realm, reality is distinct from theory and ideology (see 
Poulantzas, 1978:14); as Althusser (1979:170) warned, "'pure' science only exists on 
condition that it continually frees itself from ideology which occupies it." However, by 
the 1960s Colleti (1972) had noticed Marxism as a social study method was becoming 
increasingly divorced from its revolutionary value. By 197828, Marxists (or those 
claiming to be Marxists) were further divided by the rise of Analytical Marxism, which 
rejected what had been hitherto agreed upon across Marxist lines; that is, a difference 
between Marxist methods and 'bourgeois' social science (Bertram, 2008). Analytical 
Marxism "has recommended that Marxian theory should conform to 'normal' scientific 
methods," (Philp and Young, 2002), which principally amounts to according importance 
to individuals within both explanatory and normative theories (Wright, 1994:181). It 
considers Marxism to be burdened by methodological approaches that undermine its 
contributory and explanatory potential in mainstream social science.29 It remains Marxist, 
according to Wright (1994:192), in that it continues to work on the theoretical tradition 
established by Marx, its theoretical and empirical questions are rooted in Marxist 
discourse and themes, it uses Marxist language and terminology, and maintains a 
27 When appropriate, Marxist studies would also refer to the 'labour theory of value'. 
28 The publication of Cohen's Karl Marx's Theory: A Defence to be exact. 
29 Indeed, Vaillancourt's (1986) analysis of Marxist methods concluded that only those who accept general 
empiricism (systemic inquiry as knowledge creation) and reject crude empiricism (the rejection of solely 
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normative commitment to human dignity, freedom, and equality. 
Nonetheless, Analytical Marxism has been accused of being 'anti-Marxist' (see 
Lebowitz, 2009; Bertram, 2008). Most concerning is its methodological commitment to 
atomistic individualism, which opposes structuralist explanations and views social 
institutions and practices as explicable on their own outside broader social relations, 
thereby ignoring that individual interests and behaviours are defined by social relations 
(Bertam, 2008:113; Lebowitz, 2009:42). In regards to this thesis, the institution(s) of 
participation itself is benign; it is only when we examine participatory institutions (for 
example, local governments) in relation to how they are used in broader social relations 
of class struggle, that we begin to develop a deeper understanding of the 'essence' of 
participation. And, on an individual basis, the levers of participation are technically open 
to all - it is only when the experience of participation is differentiated on the basis of 
social groupings do we begin to reveal patterns of social contradictions, as an individual's 
experience of participation is largely prefigured by their social grouping(s). Whereas a 
feminist approach would analyse the social relations of participation on the basis of 
gender, the Marxist inspired approach employed here analyzes the social patterns of 
participation on the basis of class. This means we need to examine how participatory 
structures have been shaped by class struggle, and how particular classes are then able to 
use participatory institutions in struggle against other classes. 
Lebowitz (2009:70-2) argues that from reading Capital one understands "the 
necessity of science begins from the understanding that there is an enormous gap between 
personally experienced knowledge) produce defensible research as it represents the adoption of other social 
science methods. 
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appearances and essence."30 This suggests "that scientific truth ... is not attainable 
through induction and empiricism" (Lebowitz, 2009:72). That does not mean empirical 
evidence has no role, but that it performs only a partial role in creating scientific 
knowledge. As Lenin (1963) argued, provided the initial observations are true, moving 
from the concrete to the abstract bring scientific inquiry closer to the truth, not further 
from it. Thus, from the concrete (observed) abstract concepts must be developed, and 
then used to return to the concrete (understood) (Lebowitz, 2009:77). Marx's analytical 
project as a whole then, is to first observe the concrete; second, to develop abstract 
thoughts regarding the 'essence' of observations; third, to test and reshape the 
conceptualized essence in relation to appearance until unity is reached; and lastly, to 
reconcile the derived at concept of reality with objective reality, i.e., the concrete (Marx, 
1973:100-1, 1877:102; Lebowitz, 2009:75). 
Lastly, there are some incompatibilities between Marxism, as a critical social 
science, and conventional social science; principally, the understanding that science is 
never value-neutral, that it must be grounded in the pursuit of emancipation, and "that 
social scientists are participants in the socio-historical development of human action and 
understanding" (Comstack, 1982:377; see also Saul 2006). This thesis has no pretentions 
of being socially neutral; the decision to uncover a particular truth is not a neutral 
decision for Marxist researchers (Saul, 2006). 
For example, it appears that the sun and other planets orbit the Earth, but in essence, Earth orbits the Sun. 
A scientific explanation not preoccupied solely with appearances is required to establish the essence. A 
social example would be that in capitalist economies, one particular firm may lower its prices and increase 
its market share relative to other firms selling the same product. This gives the appearance that lowered 
prices necessarily increase market share. However, if all firms similarly lowered their prices, market share 
would not increase and profit margins would fall; ergo, the 'tendency of the rate of profit to fall'. 
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Chapter Two: The History of Social Control and Resistance in Uganda 
This thesis argues that the 'good' governance model of participation in Uganda 
has reinforced the dominant position of elite classes over poor peasants. In so doing, it 
thesis takes a dialectical materialist perspective of class struggle between poor peasants 
and more dominant classes. It argues that peasants have been historically subjugated to 
the social control of more dominant classes, and that peasants have challenged this social 
contradiction by resisting elements of social control. Dominant classes, however, are also 
not without political power, and have attempted to ameliorate resistance. As poor 
peasants struggle with dominant classes, new social structures are created. In an attempt 
to stymie bottom-up challenges, dominant classes use their power to shape emerging 
social structures in a manner that allows them to retain elements of social control over 
lower classes. To examine the 'good' governance framework of participation, then, 
without first examining the social struggles that have shaped it, would miss important 
facets of our understanding. Dominant classes, represented principally by the World 
Bank, attempt to present 'good' governance and 'participation' a-historically, as if it were 
their unsolicited gift to the poor. Rather, taking a dialectical materialist approach to 
history, we can understand that 'participation' is not a gift and that as the poor have 
struggled for participation dominant classes have only ceded a strictly controlled form of 
it. 
As such, this Chapter serves as more than just an introduction to the case study; 
rather, important components of the overall argument will be established. The Chapter 
will examine how peasants were compelled in unequal social relations with exogenous 
and local dominant classes, and how the nature of social control has reinforced social 
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contradiction. That peasants, nonetheless, have demonstrated the ability to resist control, 
and have attempted to challenge social contradictions by shaping the very structures that 
confine them, in this case, by struggling for land and democratic rights, will also be 
illustrated. A trend will then begin to take shape wherein Uganda elites respond to 
peasant resistance by imposing renewed methods of social control by stropping 
democratic and economic rights that were gained. Lastly, peasants' continued power to 
transform rural social relations will then be examined, which will bring us to the present 
era of 'good' governance. From studying Uganda's political history of social struggle for 
control and resistance to control, we will build a deeper understanding of how 
'participation' as defined by the 'good' governance framework is not a regime of 
empowerment, but conversely, an attempt to re-enforce elite social control. 
Colonial Social Control and Resistance 
While the slave trade first introduced the destructive elements of capitalist 
penetration in Uganda - stealing the most productive labourers with disastrous 
consequences to production and trade (Mamdani, 1976:19) - the year 1888 and the next 
quarter-century signify "its unification and its incorporation into the capitalist world 
system" (J0rgensen, 1981:33). Uganda's geo-strategic importance on the source of the 
river Nile, Britain's desire to expand trade between India and East Africa, and the need of 
British import-export companies already operating in the area for state cooperation in 
compelling peasants to abandon their consumptive needs, made Uganda a highly coveted 
territory for the British (Robinson et al, 1972:86; Barber, 2006; Jorgensen, 1981:40; 
Mamdani, 1976:40). 
When the British arrived there were over forty distinct socio-political systems in 
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present-day Uganda. These systems varied between highly centralized kingdoms (most 
prominent were those of the Baganda, Banyoro, Batoro and Akole peoples) and 
decentralized structures, most prominent amongst which were the Basoga, Chiga, Iteso, 
and Karamojong (J0rgenson, 1981; Kizza, 1999). The metropole secured the protectorate 
in a series of Agreements with pre-colonial ruling classes in exchange for establishing 
and protecting pseudo-feudal aristocracies (Mugaju, 2000:13),31 and utilized the Buganda 
political systems and its military power to conquer its neighbours (Kizza, 1999:68). 
With its centralized and authoritarian pre-colonial government, military levies, 
and centralized tax collection and currency, the agreement with the Buganda government 
proved the most important and allowed Uganda to expand to its current border by 
absorbing Buganda's neighbours, and for the British to open the protectorate for market 
expansion and labour (Richards, 1973). Nonetheless, several changes were made to the 
Bagandan social system, under the assumption it was feudal, seeking to formalize 
elements of property, feudal ranks and privilege. The Lukiiko (Buganda's parliament) 
was formalized, the tenure of senior chiefs stabilized, and freehold land was established 
via the 'mailo' tenure system.32 The latter arrangements would become a prime source of 
conflict as the previously divided economic and political powers of chiefs were 
31 The 1900 Buganda Agreement, the 1900 Toro Agreement, and the 1901 Ankole Agreement represent a 
formal alliance between domestic elites and the imperialists. Religious factionalism proved the catalyst for 
conquest of Uganda for the British, indirectly through Buganda. French and British Christian missionaries 
arrived in 1877 and provoked a series of religious wars which bitterly divided Baganda elites across 
Catholic and Protestant lines. The Kabaka (King) Mwanga - who was aggressively anti-sectarian - was 
expelled in 1888 only to regain the throne in 1890 as power ebbed and flowed between the Catholics, 
Protestants, and Muslims. He led an unsuccessful anti-British campaign and was again expelled in 1899, 
forcing his successor to forge an alliance with the British to ascend to power (Kizza, 1999; Fortt, 1973:66; 
Mugaju, 2000:13). 
32 The repercussions of the 'mailo' land tenure system are no infamous in Uganda. The intent was to divide 
just over 9,000 square miles among 1,000 individuals to ensure the development of large and viable 
plantations, however, within two decades more than 4,000 had a share of the land; nullifying the plantation 
economy and simultaneously inducing widespread contempt among peasants who did not get a share (Fortt, 
1973:70). 
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harmonized, creating a contentious feudal class (Apter, 1967). 
According to Mafeje (1973b) there were two classes below the Kabaka (or King) 
prior to the British: the chiefs, charged with accumulating capital through taxation and 
raising armies, and the mass of peasants who paid tribute and supplied forced labour. The 
system was not feudal however, in that chiefhood was appointed and peasants had free 
mobility. The 1900 Buganda Agreement represented the chiefs' consolidation as a class; 
through negotiation they gained a degree of independence from the Kabaka with the 
protection of their estates and hereditary rank stability. This allowed the newly created 
feudal and once productive chief class to become parasitically engaged in rentiership with 
peasants (Mafeje, 1973b:8). While a feudal class was indeed created, Mafeje's analysis 
misses one important caveat: the role of Bataka (clan heads and elders). Chiefs were 
actually separated into two categories in pre-colonial Buganda; those who were 
politically appointed representatives of the Kabaka, and the Bataka who mediated land 
disputes. Prior to the Agreement, the chiefs, now given control over the means of 
production, had only a form of political role which was entirely dependent on the 
Kabaka, but by absorbing the economic role of the Bataka, these chiefs became a 
powerful and independent class. The Bataka, meanwhile, ceased to have official authority 
in the protectorate government (Apter, 1967:113), but as will be shown, went on to lead 
peasant resistance to new forms of social control. From a peasant perspective, where they 
once had separate political and economic bodies they could play off against each other or 
bring disputes to, they now had one body that controlled them both politically and 
economically with no official means of challenging those in power. 
With these new power imbalances in mind, the main priority of the British 
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controlled protectorate administration was to introduce cash crops as part of a strategy to 
make the protectorate self-sustaining and eventually profitable (Bunker, 1981). 
Plantations of coffee and cotton were immediately introduced in Buganda which heavily 
depended on the state and the Director of Agriculture to create a labour pool through 
forced labour, the creation of migrant labour teams, and by divorcing peasants from land, 
as production became subordinated "to the accumulation needs of British capital" 
(Mamdani, 1976:4). The British did not introduce trade, but manipulated it. For example, 
the Langi tribe already grew sesame as a market crop to sell to neighbours, but this 
activity was disrupted in favour of British controlled plantations - a disruption linked to 
10,000 deaths caused by famine in Busoga in 1908 (Tosh, 1978). Indeed, overall trade 
actually declined as production was subordinated to the needs of the metropole economy, 
meaning crops Uganda did not have a comparative advantage in (such as coffee and 
cotton) replaced indigenous industries (Mamdani, 1976:48). 
Buganda remained relatively autonomous through this initial period beginning in 
1990, but faced with a failed plantation economy in 1919 the British exerted more control 
and announced a policy of 'benign' paternalism to developed Uganda as a peasant cash 
crop economy - meaning the expansion of plantations ceased and peasants outside of 
Buganda were allowed to retain customary land access but compelled to produce cash 
crops (Apter, 1967:161; Mugaju, 2000:13). Blamed for waning production due to 
property neglect, the feudal chiefs fell out of favour with the administration (Mafeje, 
1973b). A dual economy was created in Buganda wherein indigenous peasants would 
engage in mixed subsistence and market production on land owned by chiefs, while 
migrant labourers worked on coffee or cotton plantations (Apter, 1967:55). To enforce 
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cash crop production elsewhere, the protectorate government built up communication 
infrastructure and roads to strengthen its grip on power to compel peasants into market 
production and exchanges (usually through taxation), and enticed non-Baganda chiefs to 
cooperate by offering land (and protection of land) and lower-level administrative 
positions (Mugaju, 2000:13). Peasant protests, which will be discussed in more detail 
shortly, fuelled further economic reforms through the Busulu and Envuju Law of 1929, 
which introduced rent controls and stripped chiefs of eviction powers. However, peasants 
were still not permitted to sell their plots and a fixed tax was concurrently introduced in 
lieu of forced labour (Apter, 1967:190; Fortt, 1973:70-2; Mamdani, 1987b:80). 
An entirely European Uganda Legislative Council was introduced in 1920 to 
bring the government into closer consultation with business interests; one representative 
of the business community and one from the planters and ginners were included among 
the seven appointees (Apter, 1967:162). With a series of peasant protests between 1945 
and 1949 limited democratic reforms were introduced with elected seats added to the 
Legislative Council in 1948, and an entirely elected council in 1952, as part of an attempt 
to produce a western style bourgeois democracy (Mugaju, 2000:15; Mamdani, 1997:201). 
With independence looming, multipartyism appeared inevitable and the British began to 
"nurture moderate political parties as a belated fallback position to contain and neutralize 
African radicalism" (Mugaju, 2000:15). The Uganda National Congress (UNC) was the 
first to be formed (1952), and soon gave way to the Uganda People's Congress (UPC), 
the Democratic Party (DP), and the Kabaka Yekka (King Only, KY). The UNC pressed 
for immediate independence irrespective of democratic institutions; the UPC espoused an 
anti-Buganda platform; the DP strove to oppose Protestant hegemony and repel 
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socialism; and the KY were neo-traditionalists opposed to multipartyism (Jorgensen, 
1981:198; Berg-Schlosser and Siegler, 1990:99; and Mugaju, 2000:17). None of these 
parties struggled for popular democracy but rather political control, and the 1961 
elections which paved the way towards independence were widely considered fraudulent 
(Mugaju, 2000:18). 
As the changing institutional structures of social control indicate, the imposition 
of far-reaching political and economic changes during the protectorate period was met 
with fierce resistance from peasants; meaning Ugandan peasants must be understood to 
possess political power capable of challenging and shaping social structures. Peasant 
movements during Uganda's colonial history will be discussed chronologically, 
beginning with the Nyabingi movement, the cooperative movement, and movements in 
colonial Buganda. 
While England, Germany and Belgium were engaged in a struggle over control of 
the 2,045 square miles that to make up Kigezi, local peasants formed and sustained a 
resistance for roughly the first quarter of the twentieth century. Nyabinga itself is a 
religion, but its revolutionary and ideological tracts concentrating on anti-imperialism, 
land, and emancipation suggest that the religious component was a fading medium for 
peasant resistance against an imperialist enemy whose first agents were missionaries (see 
Rutandwa, 1993). The movement was materially motivated, and the absence of an 
organized political structure of elite dominance denied the British their usual means of 
social control. The immediacy of response and its ability to sustain itself as a cross-
border and cross-tribal insurgency against three colonial powers for roughly twenty-five 
years distinguishes the Nyabingi movement not only in Uganda but in all of colonial 
60 
Africa (Hopkins, 1970:258). The insurgency intensified in 1914 when World War One 
led colonial states to intensify extraction, spurring the amalgamation of guerrilla forces 
across the three colonies (Rutandwa, 1993:247). Led by bagirwa33, over 1000 peasants 
participated either in the guerrilla force or through material contributions. There was a 
distinctive class element to the conflict; it was not only a resistance against an alien 
intruder but aimed to remove ruling classes in areas with functioning political entities and 
targeted privileged society members in areas without (Rutandwa, 1993:269). Though 
gaining some successes in terms of language rights, tax and forced labour relief, and the 
replacement of Baganda agents of the protectorate with locals, the movement was 
eventually defeated militarily in 1928 (Rutandwa, 1993:169). 
The spirit of resistance was not as fierce elsewhere in Uganda, where the British 
could exert indirect control through the allegiance of local chiefs and beneficiaries of 
British imperialism. This is not to say social control was universally successful in 
ameliorating peasant political power. Indeed, the longest running peasant-based 
movement in Ugandan history - the marketing cooperative movement - saw its heyday 
throughout much of the South and East. Led by militant nationalists and failed Baganda 
landowners, peasants and workers were organized into cooperatives and trades unions in 
a struggle against the monopolistic control over cotton marketing and ginning by Indian 
merchants (Richards, 1973:87; Ebong-Opyene, 1993:44). The cooperatives and unions 
demanded the right to organize along with higher wages and prices for cotton and coffee, 
and used strikes, boycotts, and mass demonstrations to achieve these goals. Their 
33 An oracular priestess and the personification of the Nyambingi spirit; in singular known as mugirwa. 
Generally, they were healers, but become community leaders in times of armed conflict. As the armed 
conflict intensified some Abagirwa (male priests) would take up Nyambingi's personification (Rutandwa, 
1993; Hopkins, 1970). 
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growing power and a series of riots pushed the protectorate government to pass the 
Cooperatives Societies Ordinance in 1946, ostensibly to allow cooperatives to be 
registered, to aid in their organization, and to allow Africans to enter cotton ginning. In 
actuality, the Ordinance was used to divide, tame, and steer the cooperatives away from a 
mass-based peasant organization and towards a more capitalist, non-political, and profit-
making approach (Ebong-Opyene, 1993:44; Mamdani, 1983; Brett, 1970:110; Richards, 
1973:87). The cooperatives soon transitioned from a popular vehicle of dissent to an 
undemocratic, exploitative, and oppressive institution used as part of the ruling class' 
arsenal to "legitimize its rule, solidify its economic base, and ultimately consolidate its 
hold on state power" (Ddungo, 1994). This marked "the beginning of the hijacking of the 
autonomous peasant organization (Ebong-Opyene, 1993:44), a trend which is repeated or 
mimicked during the current era of participatory governance via the cooptation of 
resistance councils and the establishing of state-directed Fanners Associations. 
Nonetheless, the time frame of Bunker's (1987) analysis of the Bugisu 
Cooperative Union (BCU) takes place after this co-optation. Led by wealthy sons of 
lower level chiefs, the BCU's goal was to achieve some degree of autonomy (political 
and economic) from the state while resisting exploitation and retaining some control over 
labour. Bunker (1987:60-77) was well aware that cooperative leaders had been co-opted 
previously, but suggested 'ethnic pride' superseded their materialist interests and argued 
that through the cooperative "peasants achieved and maintained considerable political 
power" (Bunker, 1987:3) as evident by the BCU emerging as the richest, strongest and 
most politically active cooperative after successfully struggling to control coffee 
marketing in 1954. Bunker's analysis, however, is too assumptive in terms of the actual 
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nature of political power peasants achieved within the cooperative relative to cooperative 
leaders as its economic performance improved.34 Furthermore, the analysis can be 
criticized for its use of the flawed 'exit-strategy' theory as the basis of political power, its 
failure to consider the nature of BCU political activity relative to groups outside the co-
opted cooperative movement, and failure to acknowledge that BCUs fixation on market 
share, economic prowess and wealth is consistent with the aims of capitalist cooptation; 
i.e., such tendencies do not equate to resistance, but rather compliance with capitalistic 
economic restructuring. 
Returning the focus to Baganda once more, two types of nationalism emerged 
during colonialism which deeply affected the political climate, with consequences for the 
direction peasant political power took. The first type was internally directed, popular, and 
challenged local hierarchies established by the British (Apter, 1967:114). The main 
protagonists were the chiefs backed by British power and the Bataka, now stripped of its 
economic role and backed by the peasantry. The Bataka formed an association and allied 
with the peasantry in a common campaign against the now feudal chiefs, organizing a 
series of protests. The protectorate administration's attempt to dampen the protests 
motivated the enactment of the aforementioned Busulu and Envuju Law of 1929 (Apter, 
1967; Mamdani, 1987b:80; Mafeje, 1973b). After the cooperative movement was co-
opted and effectively nullified, the peasant-Bataka alliance was reinvigorated and 
organized with the Taxi Drivers' Association and the Uganda Farmers Association 
(consisting of both the Baganda poor peasantry and peasant immigrants from Ruanda-
Urundi) a series of uprisings between 1945 and 1949 to demand democratic reforms. 
Those uprisings were somewhat successful in that they pressured the protectorate to 
34 Especially considering that cooperatives had become anti-democratic and highly internally exploitative. 
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allow a limited number of elected seats in the Lukiiko (Apter, 1967:231-51; Mamdani, 
1997:207-8; Mugaju, 2000:18). The alliance among Baganda and migrant poor peasants 
did not survive the top-down class alliance remobilization on the behest of the second 
type of nationalism prevalent in Buganda - parochial - in the face of colonial reforms 
during the 1950s and the process towards independence. 
The 1950s may be referred to as the era of the 'Closer Union' crisis, in which all 
of Uganda's tribes were brought into a legislative council not directly controlled by 
Buganda. While peasants still sought their material interests of land and political power, 
and still saw the Buganda government as contradicting their interests to serve the 
prerogatives of dominant indigenous classes, they lost the allegiance of the Bataka. The 
Bataka, who had now formed the Bataka Party, was lost to the elite-centric nationalism 
preoccupied with Baganda separatism and attempts to protect its sovereignty from other 
Ugandan tribes (Apter, 1967:181-257). The boycott of non-African traders and supplies 
in 1959 is most emblematic of parochial tactics, whose impacts were felt immediately 
and declared illegal but managed to last eight months. The boycott was organized by 
Buganda's elite, who had created the Uganda Freedom Movement35 with the objective of 
achieving immediate Ugandan independence, to protect hereditary rulers, oppose 
minority rights of non-Africans, and to abolish the Wild Committee.36 Though it had 
considerable short-term impact, the boycott did little to change economic racialization 
and may have stalled the movement towards independence by drawing attention away 
from the established process publicly committed to by the protectorate government (Ghai, 
35 Itself decreed illegal by the protectorate and forced to recreate itself as the Uganda Freedom Convention, 
and then the Uganda League. 
36 Otherwise known as The Constitutional Committee and appointed in 1958. The Committee was tasked 
with mapping Uganda's constitutional evolution towards independence. Supported by the UNC (later the 
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1970). The action also meant peasant interests gave way to intra-elite struggles across 
tribal factions as the prime central government concern. 
Post-Colonial Social Control and Resistance 
The DP may have initially won the 1961 election to determine who would take 
office once Uganda was granted independence in 1962, but it never assumed power. The 
conservative and separatist KY and the centralist and African socialist UPC cited 
common Protestantism as a reason to form a coalition and assume power (Berg-Schlosser 
and Siegler, 1990:99). The KY-UPC coalition was based on compromises during the 
1961-2 constitutional negotiations in London, which saw UPC leader Milton Obote 
become Prime Minister in return for a federalist state with strongly entrenched powers for 
Buganda and the Kabaka's designation as head-of-state (Jorgensen, 1981:201). The 
alliance soon disintegrated. Disgruntled over a constitutional conflict about taxation 
rights, Kabaka Mutesa unsuccessfully attempted to overthrow Obote with the aid of army 
head Shabin Opolot in 1966 (Berg-Schlosser and Siegler, 1990:99). Obote responded by 
replacing Opolot with Idi Amin, arresting five KY ministers, exiling the Mutesa and 
declaring a state of emergency which lasted until the Amin coup of 1971. The country 
deteriorated into a de-facto one-party state and military backing became more important 
than social support, which was waning - especially in the South (Jorgensen, 1981:255-
303; Berg-Schlosser and Siegler, 1990:100; Brett, 1995; Mugaju, 2000:21). 
Economically, the country was almost entirely agricultural at independence, and 
the three tiered ethnic hierarchy (Europeans at the top, following by Asians and Africans 
respectively) meant the very small bourgeois and proletarian classes were almost entirely 
UPC) and the DP, it was opposed by Buganda's elites who were fearful it would end Buganda's hegemony 
over its Ugandan neighbours (Ghai, 1970). 
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non-African (Ramchandani, 1973; Wrigley, 1988). Class differentiation in rural areas 
was compounded by geographic disparities, with a firmly established landlord system in 
Buganda yielding large quantities of coffee on more fertile land, while northern peasants 
cultivated less profitable cotton on less productive land (O'Conner, 1988). Attempts at 
capitalist agrarian development decidedly failed by 1966 as world market prices 
disintegrated and exposed the country's lack of technology. The Economic Planning 
Commission proposed a land reform that would see tenants given legal title, but this was 
rejected by the landlord dominated Lukiiko who saw it as an undesirable concession "to 
the [urban] bourgeois elite inside and outside Buganda" (Mafeje, 1973b:21). 
Obote's government devised a series of rapid industrialization plans, but 
economic conditions gradually worsened (Southhall, 1988). Agriculture was incorporated 
into the plans in 1967 by concentrated production and exports in marketing boards and 
the National Trading Corporation. Aiming to accrue rapid growth by meeting external 
needs, the plans "ignored the need for an integrated economy with independent sectors 
[and] ... perpetuated Uganda's subordinate role in the vertical international division of 
labour" (J0rgensen, 1981:214). With no "virile national bourgeoisie" with which to work, 
the government soon embarked on state capitalism (Mafeje, 1973b). 
Obote's Common Man's Charter of 1969 was a definitive move towards total 
state control over economic activity; followed by the Nakivubo Pronouncements which 
nationalized all major enterprises, the Cooperatives Statute Act of 1970 which gave 
government discretionary powers over peasant cooperatives, and the Trade Unions Act 
which did the same for the proletariat (Bunker, 1981; Bigsten et al, 1999:11). Obote 
subsequently forcefully set about abolishing the land system in Buganda, claiming 
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landlords to be selfish and perpetuating feudalism. Nevertheless, land distribution 
remained grossly uneven, and the Common Man's Charter made no mention of remedies 
for agrarian exploitation (Mafeje, 1973b:22). This Africa Socialist project was ostensibly 
meant to address dependency on foreign capital and markets through import substitution 
industrialization, and to address the basic needs of Ugandans, but failed to engender the 
support of peasants who were antagonized by the redistribution of surplus from rural 
areas to support urban industrialization to the point that urbanites were making five times 
the income of peasants by the time Obote was ousted in 1971 (Gershenberg, 1972; 
Scoville and Due, 1977). Mafeje (1973b:24) suggests Obote could not deal with agrarian 
reform more forcibly because "he represented a weak class economically, the politico-
bureaucratic elite" (emphasis in original) which owned little land - the most productive 
economic asset. 
With Obote out of the country Amin organized a military coup in January 1971 
not only to seize power but also to forestall upcoming elections and an imminent arrest 
concerning his pattern of overspending and a murder accusation (Jergensen, 1981:268). 
Backed externally by Britain and others seeking to reclaim alienated economic interests, 
Amin was also initially championed by domestic elites for the same reasons, and peasants 
from a broad range of ethnic groups who regarded Obote as a despot (Brett, 1995; 
Mamdani, 1983, 2002). Economically, Amin reversed all the African Socialist tenets: all 
previously nationalized firms were re-privatized, and along with businesses expropriated 
from expelled Asians, were divided amongst his bourgeois allies and military officers 
(Mamdani, 1983:39). The 1974 Land Reform Decree reinforced landlordism in Buganda 
by repealing the rent control law of 1929, and also repealed usufruct land rights 
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elsewhere, thereby opening the door for unfettered capitalist entry into the countryside 
(Mamdani, 1987a, 1987b). His popularity dissipated as a result of such counter-reforms, 
the brutality of his military dictatorship, and the chaos of public life (Berg-Schlosser and 
Siegler, 1990:100). 
With constant challenges to his power, Amin "took refuge in provoking external 
conflicts" (Berg-Schlosser and Siegler, 1990:100); which eventually proved to be his 
undoing. A 1978 attack on Tanzania motivated its government to actively support Amin's 
opponents by hosting the Moshi Conference, which served to unite more than twenty 
opposition groups and form the Uganda National Liberation Front (UNLF). Given the 
Amin regime's clampdown on any internal opposition, and military spending in excess of 
forty per cent of Uganda's total budget, it was assumed the degree of social control was 
so entrenched that any successful resistance effort must come externally (Berg-Schlosser 
and Siegler, 1990:101, Nyeko, 1997). The resistance was successful, but its external 
origin embedded a disconnection.between liberators and "the poor state in which the vast 
majority of Ugandan citizens then lived" (Nyeko, 1997). 
The interim administration led by Yusuf Lule and Godfrey Binaisa tried to delay 
elections to allow time for internal movements to materialize, but were sacked by the 
Obote-supporter dominated UNLF, who then replaced the interim Presidents with their 
own appointee and immediately announced multi-party elections to take place at the end 
of 1980 (Berg-Schlosser and Siegler, 1990:101). The party spectrum resembled that of 
the 1960s, involving the UPC and the DP along with a new Conservative Party (mainly 
Bagandans) and the Uganda People's Movement (UPM) supported by well educated 
Banyoro. Again, Obote's regime came to power after what many feel to be another 
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fraudulent election result, and the political atmosphere soon deteriorated into an armed 
resistance against Obote's regime (Mamdani, 1988; Berg-Schlosser and Siegler, 
1990:101; Mugaju, 2000:22). Three insurgent groups materialized, including the National 
Resistance Army (NRA), and Obote's Presidency fell to a military coup for the second 
time, in July 1985. The new president, Tito Okello, offered to integrate the insurgent 
groups within his government, but Yoweri Museveni's National Resistance Movement 
(NRM) elected to keep fighting, and its military wing, the NRA, successfully seized 
Kampala in January 1986 (Berg-Schlosser and Siegler, 1990:102). 
While the Obote II37 regime abandoned its earlier African Socialist sympathies 
and instead embraced neoliberal conditionalities handed down by the IMF in exchange 
for structural adjustment loans, the NRM regime came to power with a wave of optimism 
concerning political and economic recovery and an unwillingness to abide by IMF and 
World Bank conditions (Berg-Schlosser and Siegler, 1990:105; Bibangambah, 2001). 
Unable to raise the funds to repay previous loans, the regime soon gave into IMF pressure 
and accepted a 'Economic Recovery Program' emphasizing agrarian privatization and 
trade liberalization (World Bank, 1993:vii; United Nations, 2000:1; World Trade 
Organization, 1995:10; Bigsten et al, 1999; Bibangambah, 2001). 
The arrival of the NRM to power brings us to the current era of struggle for social 
control, as influenced by the 'good' governance agenda, and the main temporal focus of 
this thesis, which will be critiqued in the next chapter. First, however, we must take 
account of peasant resistance during the post-independence and pre-NRM and 'good' 
governance period - one marked by highly oppressive and authoritarian governments 
which ultimately helped bring to power the current NRM government. Only two large-
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scale peasant movements occurred in this period of intense control, but the movements 
themselves reached a new plateau of scope and intent, and therefore posed a greater 
challenge to hegemonic control. 
Known for its brazen initiative of creating an alternative state structure 
autonomous from the central Ugandan government, the Rwenzururu Movement was 
Uganda's first peasant movement to materialize in the post-independence era. The 
organized political action was a response to state organized oppression of the Baamba 
and Bakonzo tribes in the Toro Kingdom of western Uganda, a kingdom dominated by 
the Batoro after they agreed to mediate colonial interests in the 1900 Toro Agreement 
(Syahuka-Muhindo, 1994; Mamdani, 1997:197). Lead by local clan heads, Bakonzo 
peasants first unsuccessfully rebelled over tax, land alienation, labour, and tribute from 
1919-1921 (Syahuka-Muhindo, 1994), but of particular concern here is the much longer 
and combined Baamba and Bakonzo movement from 1962 to 1982. Though led mostly 
by petty bourgeois forces, it was peasant grievances, solidarity, and shared identity 
developed during the constitutional process that forged a shared Baamba and Bakonzo 
movement in the Rwenzururu Mountains (Syahuka-Muhindo, 1994; Mamdani, 
1997:197). 
In the nascent stages of the movement the petty bourgeois leaders pursued legal 
tactics in the Ugandan legislature, but the imprisonment of their members radicalized the 
peasantry; while much of the petty bourgeois faction wanted to continue legislative 
manoeuvres and petitioning, the radicalized peasantry rallied behind a more militant 
37 As it is commonly known. 
38 Generally labeled as such for their ownership of small agricultural product marketing and retail 
enterprises, a higher degree of education, 'professionalism' and commercial connections outside the 
immediate locality. 
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leadership and armed struggle39 as the route towards emancipation. It was, however, the 
establishment of the Rwenzururu Kingdom Government (RKG) that made this movement 
particularly noteworthy. Initially, the RKG's system of governent embraced grassroots 
popular democracy, complete with councils and committees linking villages and counties 
to the central RKG. Village chiefs were independently elected by the village, and higher 
chiefs and ministers were confirmed by an elected assembly (Mamdani, 1997:199; 
Syahuka-Muhindo, 1994:268-298). This structure proved an effective means of peasant 
mobilization and social reorganization, and for Mamdani (1997:198), represented a form 
of intra-tribal civil-war wherein peasant-ruling class relations were forcefully reorganized 
from the bottom-up to deconstruct patterns of social control. 
Not everyone offers a glowing, assessment, however. Syahuka-Muhindo 
(1994:273) argues that while early RKG leaders may have been drawn mostly from the 
poor peasantry, this is not because of institutional arrangements but due to petty 
bourgeois elements, seeking to identify with other Ugandan petty bourgeois elements, 
abandoning the movement.40 Also, forming the RKG so early proved costly as it 
eventually demobilized the peasantry, making the movement not only susceptible to 
defeat but also to internal power enclaves (Syahuka-Muhindo, 1994:273; see also Kasfir, 
2008). With the peasantry largely demobilized, petty bourgeois factions slowly retook 
control and without a popularly organized leadership mechanism were able to seek more 
self-interested economic rather than broader political gains in a 1982 settlement with the 
Obote government (Syahuka-Muhindo, 1994:313). 
39 Interestingly, the leadership adopted a no-gun policy with the logic that the use of guns would invite the 
central government to use excessive fire power to quash the movement at a time when it could not acquire 
adequate modern weaponry. For most of the armed conflict the peasant guerrilla force used traditional 
weaponry (Syahuka-Muhindo, 1994). 
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By the time the Rwenzururu movement came to its official conclusion another 
movement was already well underway, one that Mamdani (1997:187) considers "[t]he 
most serious attempt yet to dismantle the regime of indirect rule in the local state." This 
movement, the National Resistance Movement (NRM) and its military wing the National 
Resistance Army (NRA), would go on to seize state power in 1986 and has continued to 
rule up to the time of this writing. While the two movements overlap, the link between 
them remains contested. Syahuka-Muhindo (1994) suggests the NRA contacted remnants 
of the Rwenzururu leadership in 1985, and that the remnants of the latter movement 
organized the transport of arms, and provided food and shelter. Feelings of 'tokenism' 
and betrayal among peasants over the 1982 settlement convinced some to attempt to 
revive the Rwenzururu movement with the aid of the NRM, but the relationship turned 
sour after the NRA/M took state power and sent troops to the Rwenzururu Mountains to 
root out any remnants of the movement, and refused to grant federal status (Syahuka-
Muhindo, 1994). Others suggest the NRA/M's leadership learned more from Frelimo41 
during visits to its training camps, in particular concepts such as 'popular justice' (Baker, 
2004). Museveni (1997:29) recalls his admiration for Frelimo's Resistance Councils 
(RCs) and that insistence that emancipation was not simply a matter of Africanization. 
Thus, while there is no evidence of a direct linkage between the two Ugandan 
movements, Mamdani (1997:200) suggests the real linkage is in strategy and 
circumstance: both movements were compelled to create a state structure in guerrilla 
controlled areas that gave 'checks and balances' to the peasantry in order to marshal their 
40 A precedent that would be followed in the Luwero Triangle during the 'Bush War' of the 1980s. 
41 Frelimo is also known as the Frente de Libertacao de Mozambique. Racial politics plagued Frelimo in 
the early stages, but as an exiled force it required a deeper political programme to gain mass peasant 
support as it shifted operations between tribal territories. Frelimo's leadership is credited with developing 
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mobilization; an issue that will be returned to shortly with the discussion of Resistance 
Councils. 
The NRA/M formed when Museveni's Popular Resistance Army allied with 
Yusuf Lule's Uganda Freedom Fighters in 1981, in response to what many regard as 
fraudulent post-Amin elections perpetrated by Obote's UPC (Piron and Norton, 2004:4). 
Eventually, the NRA/M would complete the rare feat of seizing state power in Africa as 
an insurgent movement without external support (Ngoga, 1998; Kanyogonya, 2000). It 
would do so primarily via what is referred to as the 'Bush War' in the Luwero Triangle of 
Buganda, from where the movement also drew most of its participants. 
The motivation behind participation for the Baganda peasantry remains debated. 
For Mamdani (1997:200) the NRA/M was tasked with recreating the social alliance 
between Baganda poor peasants and peasant immigrants that pre-existed Buganda's 
parochial politics. To do so, the NRA/M had to redefine the basis of rights on the grounds 
of residence and away from the basis of descent; ergo, for Mamdani, it was necessary for 
the NRA/M to breed a class-identity among its potential participants. Given that the 
major internal contradiction was ethnic, with the majority of the participants being 
Baganda while the leaders were Banyankole-Bakiga (Museveni's tribe), one can deduce 
that the NRA did indeed have to ameliorate any parochial political tendencies (Ngoga, 
1998:100). Museveni's (1997:48-141) writings seem to confirm this, as he recounts 
suppressing tribal sentiments among new recruits and insists they were successful in 
changing mentalities away from tribal leanings. 
Kasfir (2005) disagrees, and stipulates that the NRA began their guerrilla war in 
peasant class-consciousness through protracted struggle (also repeated by the NRA/M) which necessitated 
continued peasant participation after their tribal territory had been liberated (Saul, 1973b, 1979). 
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Buganda precisely because peasants there considered the current government as their 
ethnic rival. Kasfir backs up this claim with interviews from several peasant participants 
who remember being persuaded to join the movement by ethno-centric promises, such as 
the restoration of the Kabaka position. Additionally, Kasfir argues that some of the early 
peasant support may merely have been out of self-interest, as NRA officers would pay for 
supplies and the peasants, due to the conditions of war and general economic chaos, had 
no other means of selling their crops. Lastly, Kasfir asserts that at least some of the 
peasant participation must have been coercive. Given the violence and imprisonment of 
NRA enemies that peasants bore witness to, it is likely that at least some of the peasants 
would have been intimidated (intentionally or not) into active participation if not passive 
compliance (see also Tideman, 1994). Nevertheless, Kasfir concedes, although peasants 
in the Luwero triangle never directly demanded the arrival of the NRA/M, their general 
reaction was positive, mostly due to the ability to participate in the democratic practices 
oftheRCs. 
The RCs were the first democratic institution to be created in Ugandan villages 
(Kasfir, 2005). The original committees, that would later form RCs, were at first 
dominated by relatively wealthy villagers who were becoming dictatorial over the 
peasantry. This negatively affected mobilization and the NRA officers stepped in to 
correct the contradiction (Tideman, 1994:85; Kasfir, 2005). In essence, the peasants 
exchanged their participation in the movement for political rights and democracy. RCs 
were used clandestinely in government controlled areas as well, and although these were 
largely undemocratic they were used for mobilization and intelligence gathering (Baker, 
2004). Though at times the commitment to popular participatory democracy was 
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withdrawn under severe military pressure, for reasons of ideological conviction and 
civilian dependence the NRA/M stands out for remaining committed to the practice of 
participatory democracy though the course of its guerrilla war (Kasfir, 2005), during 
which roughly 100,000 people lost their lives (Piron and Norton, 2004:4). 
At his swearing-in address, Museveni described the NRA/M's program as one of 
democracy, security, ethnic unity, and antithetical to "a mere change of guard: it is a 
fundamental change in the politics of our country" (Museveni, 2000:3-7). During the 
'Bush War' the NRM secretariat released its Ten Point Program of issues they would 
concentrate on after seizing power. In addition to the three just mentioned, this plan 
focused on Ugandan independence, social services, pan-Africanism, anti-corruption, 
internally displaced persons, and a mixed economy (Museveni, 1997:217; "The Ten-
Point Programme"). However, described as a Marxist-Leninist entering the guerrilla war, 
Museveni, according to Mazrui (2000:131), contradicts the general trend and was 
effectively de-radicalized by revolution, becoming "almost totally uncritical of Western 
powers." The political program implemented following the 1986 NRA/M victory will be 
carefully scrutinized in the following chapter. 
Conclusion 
Uganda's colonial history more or less fits the classic British model of indirect 
rule through complicit local elites, who cooperated in subjugating Uganda's economy to 
metropole needs in exchange for expansion and protection of their exploitative 
relationship with peasants. Peasants were strongly controlled in a bifurcated state system 
where they had no democratic rights. Political and economic elites were consolidated into 
one class; in Buganda, this class was positioned as landlords and controlled the Lukiiko. 
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Taxes, forced labour, the imposition of rent, and threats of land alienation compelled 
peasants to engage in unequal social relations with parasitic elites. 
Nonetheless, peasants demonstrated a degree a political power and resistance that 
reflected their material interests to challenge not only colonial structures but local social 
contradictions. The Nyabinga movement resisted imperial intruders and local elites and 
were able to gain tax relief and relief from forced labour before suffering military defeat. 
Later, and elsewhere, the cooperative movement challenged economic dominance 
through strikes, boycotts and mass demonstrations, achieving the right to exist before 
colonial elites co-opted it. In Buganda, peasants were able to achieve limited economic 
gains in the Busulu and Envuju Law of 1929, and later were able to achieve limited 
political gains in a partially elected Lukiiko, through mass protests and uprisings. 
Peasants were able to successfully struggle for limited gains, such as rent controls, but 
failed to overturn or fundamentally transform broader structural mechanisms of social 
control and class dominance. 
The political arena was largely turned into a power struggle for control between 
petit-bourgeois factions divided along ethnic and religious lines, leading up to and after 
independence. It was not until his control as president began to wane did Obote begin to 
challenge exploitative class relations in rural areas, but from the peasant perspective, his 
first term in office largely saw their surplus product appropriated and accumulated in 
urban areas in favour of urban industrialization, from which they never had the chance to 
benefit. From a control aspect, peasants, along with urban workers, saw the basic right to 
vote erode. Amin continued the dictatorial tactics, and led one of the most controlling and 
tyrannical regimes the world has seen in recent history. He also overturned the limited 
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economic gains peasants struggled for during the colonial era. The reign of terror did not 
end with his presidency. 
Through the intense period of struggle over post-colonial social control, the 
ability to form any peasant movement was severely constrained. Nonetheless, peasants in 
the Rwenzururu movement were able to establish an alternative state. By doing so, they 
challenged and overturned basic structures of rural social control, and formed a 
grassroots popular democracy - albeit one that eventually collapsed. Peasants in the 
Luwero triangle also challenged rural political and economic contradictions by forming 
Resistance Councils. Their struggle eventually succeeded, took state power, and 
expanded throughout the country. It was peasants who resisted social control, established 
a popular and grassroots form of democracy, and challenged rural class oppression and 
economic structures. As we will see in the next chapter, the 'good' governance 
framework of participation attempts to reverse this trend, not expand on it. 
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Chapter Three: Uganda's Model of 'Good' Governance Participation 
The previous chapter illustrated the struggle over social control in colonial and the 
early post-colonial (1962-1986) Uganda. Political restructuring in favour of democratic 
reforms and greater participation has been established not as a gift bestowed by dominant 
actors, but a response to peasant resistance to social control. This Chapter, then, will 
discuss the latest articulation of the struggle over social control in rural Uganda, as 
shaped by the language of 'good' governance and participation, within a World Bank 
driven model of development. 
Before examining the model of 'good' governance participation deployed in 
Uganda, the NRM regime's relationship with poor peasants must be explored. As 
demonstrated in the previous chapter, peasant participation in the 'Bush War' helped 
bring the NRM to power, and the NRM in turn provided a means - through resistance 
councils - by which the poor peasantry could challenge social contradictions in the 
countryside, particularly through addressing land issues and popular control of local 
governance. Therefore, it must first be demonstrated that the NRM no longer represents 
the peasantry in challenging social control, but rather, now embodies such control. As 
such, the first section of this Chapter will consider the NRM's struggle for social control, 
and its attempt to legitimize itself and Museveni's now twenty-five year presidency as 
democratic and popularly representative. 
After this discussion, the institutional structure, functions, and social composition 
of Uganda's 'good' governance model of participation will be analyzed. Three main 
institutions or actors have been identified as central to this model: the PRSP and its host 
government department, the Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development 
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(MFPED); Local Councils; and Civil Society. The analysis of each is divided into three 
parts: first, a brief introduction to its position or role within the broader 'good' 
governance model of participation in Uganda; second, the nature of participation and its 
elements of social control found within each unit; and third, a description of the 
tyrannical use of power that shapes each unit and its impact on the poor peasantry. 
The NRM and the Struggle for Social Control 
Upon taking power the NRM insisted it was to be an interim government, and that 
it would allow the formation of a democratically elected government after drafting a new 
Constitution. Four years later, however, Museveni (2000:44-8) used war in the north , 
external threats to security, and declining prices on exports as justification to extend the 
interim period - giving no definitive end date. When the constitution was enacted in 
1995, nine years after taking power, it was made clear that the NRM was no longer 
intending to be an interim government - symbolically represented by changing its name 
to simply the 'Movement' and reintroducing itself as Uganda's system of government. 
The Constitution was derived from the Odoki Commission that solicited views 
from around the country on governance issues and the role of different bodies (the 
judiciary, legislature, and executive). The Constitutional Assembly (CA) followed to 
draft the new Constitution reflecting its conclusion that the populace retains the right to 
democratically select a new political system, but that the Movement system would 
remain in control until such a time; however, most CA members were NRM supporters, 
according to Barya (2000). It was determined that such a referendum would be held in 
2000 to approve the Constitution, and select Uganda's system of governance. While 
Bazaara (2003b: 11) claims that both NRM critics and supporters agree the drafting 
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process "was the most participatory in the history of Uganda," Furley (2000) provides a 
contradictory analysis. According to Furley, while the constitutional commission held 
consultations throughout the country, the general complaint was that the agenda and 
discussions were controlled by the commissioners; rumours of fraudulence and a pre-
drafted Constitution spread rapidly. In the end, the commission produced no answers to 
important questions on multipartyism, federalism, and traditional monarchies, instead 
referring these matters back to the NRM. It must also be noted that while the CA was 
technically popularly elected, Furley (2000) contends unlimited campaign spending and 
sizeable bribery meant wealth, or the support of the wealthy, was a prerequisite for 
inclusion. 
A no-party movement system was thus extended indefinitely, with Museveni 
entrenched as President. The system must be differentiated from multipartyism, one-party 
states, and military dictatorships: it is justified as a fully inclusive system wherein all 
citizens are considered members of the Movement with merit-based elections and no 
organized political opposition (Piron and Norton, 2004:7). Olaka-Onyango (2000a:44) 
traces the history of Movement-democracy in Uganda and has aptly divided it in the 
following phases: 1986-9, a transitional phase as the Movement attempted to embrace a 
broad-based government and coalitional parties; 1989-1992/3, when the Movement 
entered a phase of permanence and exclusionism while moving towards banning 
oppositional parties; 1993-5, when the Movement consolidated undemocratic gains 
through the constitutional process; post-1995, when the Movement trekked its way to the 
creation of a de facto one-party state which culminated in a 1998 Movement National 
Conference where it established the Politburo and National Political Commissar Office 
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staffed by Movement directorate; and finally the 2000 referendum to anoint the 
Movement as the lone-Ugandan party by suppressing organized opposition. 
Over the years there have been several justifications for this system, which 
include: a conflictual history blamed on political parties; a need for an extended period of 
reconciliation and consensus-building after a prolonged period of violence; that 
consensus-building reflects true 'African values'; that political parties are based on class 
divisions, whereas Uganda is peasant based and therefore devoid of class divisions; that 
without classes, political parties breed sectarianism; that a no-party Movement system 
guarantees national unity; that the system is most likely to bring about equitable 
distribution of resources and development; that this development will eventually give rise 
to social classes which at some point could support multipartyism; and finally, that 
Ugandans have demonstrated overwhelming democratic support for the system in the 
2000 referendum (Piron and Norton, 2004:7-8; Kasfir, 2004; Museveni, 1997:195-7). 
Two issues among these justifications must be dealt with, one being that of class, 
the other being popular support. In regards to class, Museveni is overtly contradictory. In 
his 1997 book Museveni (1997:27) criticizes Nyerere's ujamma plan as a primitive 
communalism which did not recognize the existence of pre-colonial classes and 
exploitation in rural Africa. Later in the same book, Museveni (1997:195) dismisses 
multipartyism in Uganda on the basis of one peasant class. However, as Kasfir 
emphatically states, and as discussed in the previous chapter: 
"[i]t is necessary to put on blinders to ignore the class divisions in 
Ugandan society. To an important degree, sectarian conflicts in 
Ugandan society rest on class differences. If the presence of class 
cleavages provides the basic justification for parties, Uganda is ready 
for a multiparty political system" (2007:70). 
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According to the latest census, 87.6 per cent of Ugandans reside in rural areas, with 77 
per cent of the working population active in agricultural labour (Uganda Bureau of 
Statistics, 2002). These findings are often used to dismiss the presence of class divisions 
in Uganda, and posit that the country's populace is comprised of one class, an 
undifferentiated peasantry. However, using the data in the Appendix and further 
analyzing the means of production among the peasantry, and peasant relationships to the 
means of production, class stratification among the peasantry emerges. One can see that a 
minority of rich peasants have access to 43 times more (and better) land than poor 
peasants, own ten times more value in labour implements (such as hoes and other tools) 
and can afford to apply substantially more agricultural inputs such as fertilizer. Rich 
peasants are able to perform more labour on their own land, and hire ten times more 
labour than poor peasants. Furthermore, rich peasants are more likely to live farther away 
from farms and participate in non-agricultural labour. Though poor peasants produce 
substantially more foodstuffs per acre, by virtue of land size, rich peasants are 
nonetheless able to produce roughly five times more agricultural output. In between these 
two classes sit middle peasants. Roughly equal to poor peasants in terms of population, 
middle peasants have access to more means of production, hire more labour and perform 
more non-agricultural labour, and produce more agricultural outputs than poor peasants. 
What this information tells us is that Uganda is far from having one peasant class. 
References to an undifferentiated peasantry and an absence of class cleavages, therefore, 
has been falsely used by those with central state power to shape an imagery of a Ugandan 
polity with uniform socio-economic interests, and to legitimize the closure of official 
political competition and class representation as democratically representative. That the 
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Movement system is popularly supported is also questionable. 
While the referendum results were decidedly in favour of the Movement system, 
it was far from a fair campaign. As Barya (2005:35) explains, "[b]y participating in the 
referendum, the multipartyists would be committing political suicide" as the referendum 
would likely make organized opposition illegal; 'outing' oneself as oppositional risked 
becoming lawfully criminal. Piron and Norton's (2004:9) research indicates "a high 
degree of dissatisfaction with the current political system, in particular, the lack of 
political space to organize," a point that will be revisited in the section addressing civil 
society. Also, when considering polling from 2000 to 2002 by Afrobarometer, support for 
the Movement system rapidly declined following the referendum. Whereas in 2000, 72 
per cent of respondents were 'satisfied' with the level of democracy in Uganda and only 
17 per cent were 'unsatisfied'; two years later 60 per cent were 'satisfied' while 32 per 
cent were 'unsatisfied' (Logan et al, 2003). By 2008, an Afrobarometer poll announced 
that only 37 per cent of polled Ugandan's responded that the country "is a democracy and 
are satisfied with democracy" (Mattes et al, 2010).42 Growing cynicism correlates with a 
growing sentiment that the Movement is no longer all-inclusive and is dominated by 
Museveni's family, kin, and the 'old guard' from the 'Bush War' (Makara et al, 2009).43 
Kasfir (2004:60-70) provides a critical examination of the NRJVI's systematic use 
of'Movement-democracy' to legitimize itself while tightening its grip on political power. 
Kasfir argues that although there is some substance to claims of unprecedented 
democracy in Uganda since the NRM seized power - fuelled by an extraordinary number 
42 According to the same report, this finding positions Uganda between Liberia (37%) and Burkina Faso 
(36%), ahead of neighbouring Kenya (27%) but well behind neighbouring Tanzania (65%) and Botswana 
(80%). 
43 This sentiment is substantiated by figures such as 71 per cent of the Cabinet being Bahima, Museveni's 
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of elections considered free and fair - this democracy has been increasingly constrained 
by the limits of the Movement system. Kasfir's argument that the Movement system has 
been falsely used as a basis of legitimacy has five parts: one, complex colonial legacies 
made achieving national legitimacy particularly problematic when the NRM seized 
power; two, the NRM's support base was small when it formed national government and 
was based on a geographically condensed guerrilla war without much national exposure; 
three, initial legitimacy was gained by expanding the Movement system along with 
Resistance Councils; four, contradictory, shifting, and self-serving rationales for the 
system suggest it is more of a tool to gain power than build democracy; and five, the 
Movement system has been used to entrench the NRM and Museveni's power rather than 
to expose it to the electorate. Most fundamental to consolidating its grip on power, 
however, was the NRM's use of RCs/LCs. Their non-interference during RC/LC 
elections gave the NRM unprecedented popularity at first as peasants were granted 
democratic rights, but ultimately, it mean that every village and every peasant who voted 
was necessarily supporting the NRM with the RC system brought under central control 
under RC Statute No. 9, 1987, and having no position to influence national policy 
(Kasfir, 2004). We can thus see how the Movement system has been used a means of 
social control from above, not control of the State from the bottom. 
Before drawing this section to a close, new developments must be taken into 
account. The NRM 'u-turned' on the 2000 referendum and announced a return to 
multipartyism in 2003, but as Makara et al (2003) argues, this was only after 
constitutional amendments allowed "the executive and the central political leadership to 
remain in power." These amendments include scrapping presidential term limits, and 
tribal group; the Cabinet also controls three-quarters of the national budget (Mwenda, 2008). 
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expanding executive powers while reducing the authority of parliament and watchdog 
organizations, including the Electoral Commission (Makara et al, 2003; Mwenda, 2007). 
While all members of parliament had been officially considered part of the Movement, 
some still identified with officially defunct parties, and the reintroduction of 
multipartyism saw these parties spring back to life - though considerably weakened 
(Piron and Norton, 2004). Still, Museveni's vote share fell from 76 per cent in 1996 and 
69 percent in 2001 (before oppositional parties were officially allowed to field 
candidates) to 59 per cent in 2006, "even through the main opposition candidate was 
jailed throughout much of the campaign period" (Mattes et al, 2010). 
This main opposition candidate is former NRA colonel and medical doctor for 
Museveni, Dr. Kizza Besigye, leader of the Forum for Democratic Change (FDC) and 
official candidate of the Inter-Party Cooperation (IPC).44 He ran for Presidency from 
within the Movement in 2001 before the reintroduction of multipartyism, but was self-
exiled after claiming persecution based on a NRM allegation he is linked to rebel groups 
(Piron and Norton, 2004:10; Makara et al, 2009). The electoral process in Uganda is 
marred by confusion, and the distinction between the NRM and the state are blurred, with 
Museveni campaigning using state resources such as army helicopters and receiving 
endorsements from state officials (Piron and Norton, 2004:9). In 2003 Brock et al 
(2003:15) concluded, "the exchange of votes for material benefits is embedded in the 
day-to-day political economy of the country." 
This situation does not appear to have changed: on 20 January 2011 alone, the 
Daily Monitor (Uganda) reported a clash between IPC and NRM members after NRM 
44 A coalition of opposition parties (FDC, Uganda People's Congress (UPC), the Conservative Party (CP) 
and JEEMA, but excluding the Democratic Party (DP)), agreed to field one Presidential candidate. Dr. 
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officials were allegedly caught distributing money to residents, "asking them not to 
attend Dr Besigye's rallies;" and also reported the opposition MPs had received (but 
rejected) a sizable bribe from the NRM ahead of the elections, supposedly reminiscent of 
bribes allegedly used to convince MPs to scrap presidential term limits. These two reports 
add to a series of new events involving violence and alleged corruption ahead of the 
February 2011 elections.45 The Electoral Commission announced a Museveni victory 
with 68 per cent of the vote, but the results were rejected by opposition leaders amidst 
various Daily Monitor reports of bribery; election rigging by way of 'pre-ticked' ballots 
and 'ghost' voters; intimidation and arrests of those expressing dissatisfaction with 
Museveni; and heaving policy, military, and paramilitary presence in streets to thwart 
potential demonstrations. These reports are consistent with preliminary findings by the 
European Union's Election Observation Mission (EOM) in Uganda that widely observed 
"[t]he distribution of money and gifts by candidates" and "found that the power of 
incumbency was exercised to such an extent as to compromise severely the level playing 
field."46 
Institutional Functions and Roles of Participatory 'Good' Governance 
PRSP and the Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development 
I) Position or role in the broader 'good' governance model: 
The most important body of policies of the 'good' governance development 
Besigye won the nomination through IPC elections. 
45 Violence was personally witnessed while conducting research for this thesis in Uganda in June 2010. An 
IPC rally was held in Kampala to protest against the Electoral Commission, accused of being NRM-biased. 
The rally came to a violent end as the 'Kiboko Squad' (known for using canes [kiboko] to 'whip' their 
targets, usually at opposition rallies) intermingled with riot police and charged the crowd, with Dr. Besigye 
himself being 'whipped' and beaten. 
46 These statements can be found at 
http://eueom.eu/files/pressreleases/english/press release preliminarystatementUganda 20 februaryen.pd 
f; the final report is scheduled to be released in May, 2011. 
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agenda, consistent with other recipient countries, is the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 
(PRSP), for which Uganda is often presented as a showcase model. The Poverty 
Eradication Action Plan (PEAP) was released in 1997 and later became the first officially 
recognized PRSP in 2000. The Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic 
Development (MFPED) wields the primary position in Uganda's structure of 
participation. Though not generally regarded as a 'participatory' institution, because it is 
not, the MFPED hosts the PEAP and oversees its implementation, including the Uganda 
Participatory Poverty Assessment Process (UPPAP) - the participatory component in 
formulating the PEAP. By virtue of not being a 'participatory' institution, the MFPED 
tends to be overlooked in studies on participation in Uganda even though it is internally 
autonomous from the presidency, parliament, and other departments, and nevertheless is 
seen to 'drive' the policy process of the PEAP and all its subsidiaries (Foster and 
Mijumbi, 2002:3). 
Consistent with other PRSPs, the document contains four pillars which act as the 
apex of development policy in Uganda: economic growth, 'good' governance, income 
generation, and quality of life (MFPED, 2004). Central to rural development, the PEAP's 
policies act as a guide for Uganda's Plan for the Modernisation of Agriculture (PMA), 
which in turn has the following four major objectives: 1) reduce subsistence peasant 
poverty via improved efficiency and a greater shift towards market reliance, 2) enhance 
food security through reliance on market as opposed to self-sufficiency, 3) increase off-
farm income generation opportunities in rural areas, and 4) sustainable research 
management for purposes of technological modernization (MAAIF and MFPED, 2000). 
Under the rubric of the PMA sit a series of development programs at the more local level, 
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the most important two being the National Agricultural Advisory Services (Naads) and 
Collaborative Forest Management (CFM). Key outputs of the Naads program include 
projects designed to generate technological advances, develop enterprises, and build 
market linkages (MAAIF, 2000; Nahdy, 2004; Friis-Hanson, 2008). CFM schemes are 
established, in utilization of Naads, to 'empower' peasants to diversity their forestry 
livelihood opportunities through tree production and nursery enterprises, agro-foresty, 
non-timber forest products, improved marketing and trading, and ecotourism (Naidoo and 
Adamowicz, 2005). 
From the information given above, a basic schematic of rural development 
policies may be illustrated by the following figure: 
Schematic of Rural Development Policy 
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Paramount to the analysis formed in this Chapter is the failure to consider class and 
economic inequalities in any of the objectives shown above. All four of these main units 
of policy assume the presence of rural uniformity and the absence of class contradictions. 
By eliminating class from the lexicon of social understanding, the 'good' governance 
agenda fails to anticipate a differentiated ability among peasants to respond to 'pro-poor' 
policies that rely on commercialization, enterprise development, and the adoption of 
modern technologies. 
II) Participation and the struggle for social control: 
The UPPAP embodies the participatory process in formulating the PEAP. The 
UPPAP was designed by civil society47 with the mandate to achieve middle ground 
between empowering the poor and extracting useful data for policy making (Bird and 
Kakende, 2001:53); but the inclusion, or lack thereof, of the poor has been heavily 
criticized. Methodologically, the UPPAP has been criticized for employing the Rapid 
Rural Appraisal approach instead of Participatory Rural Appraisal (Holland and 
Blackburn, 1998). Furthermore, the lack of a well-defined consultation process allowed 
the World Bank to use "the opportunity to convince the government of the supremacy of 
market-led economies in poverty reduction" (Namara, 2010:9). Though 644 people were 
considered to have participated in the consultation process, Namara (2010:10) argues "the 
basis for consultation was the already conceived draft and it was more of a sensitisation 
exercise ... [i]ndeed the participation of the people was aimed at reducing resistance 
against the unpopular macro-economic market-based policies." Hence, debates on macro-
economic policies from participating CSOs were not permitted (Nanna et al, 2002). 
The second UPPAP in 2002 is claimed to be more participatory (Piron and 
Norton, 2004:13), but Wordofa (2004) claims that the process still marginalized the poor, 
"caused by the lack of recognition of the differences among and within communities." 
Though the second UPPAP did expand the number of participants to 2,449 it nonetheless 
continued the precedent set earlier of attempting to sensitise participants to pre-drafted 
policies (Namara, 2010). 
The information concerning how influential the UPPAP has actually been on the 
47 Civil society's role in formulating the PEAP and implementing the UPPAP will be examined more 
closely in the section concerning civil society specifically. 
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PEAP is inconclusive at best. Foster and Mijumbi (2002:35) claim the UPPAP has 
influenced the revised 2000 PEAP considerably by emphasizing the need to support rural 
markets, financial and credit services, micro and small businesses, disaster management, 
and land security. Other analyses rely on unsubstantiated assumptions. Piron and Norton 
(2004:26) assume the process has been very influential, as indicated by more districts 
demanding to be included in the second UPPAP. This assumption is dubious - more 
districts demanding to be included may be just as indicative of exclusion as it is 
indicative of influence. Blackburn, Chambers and Gaventa (2000) assume the UPPAP 
has been influential simply because it is located in the MFPED - but fail to support this 
claim with any evidence. Conversely, the Panos Institute (2002) claims that the World 
Bank owned the consultation process and directed the debate. Most ominously, the first 
UPPAP was conducted after the original PEAP was released (Piron and Norton, 2004:13; 
Bird and Kakende, 2001:46), leaving one to infer it had no influence. 
That the UPPAP, and the PEAP in general, finds its home in the MFPED warrants 
a closer examination, as there is a "perception that the Ministry of Finance has been 
excessively authoritarian, ungenerous to deserving parts of the Government in its 
management of the budget process, and rather closely associated with donors" (Booth 
and Nsabagasani, 2005 :vii). What is problematic is the MFPED is internally autonomous 
from the presidency and other departments in Uganda but externally dependent on the 
donor agencies to the extent that donor World Bank Group staff is considered part of the 
Ministry's human resources; that the Ministry actively encourages donor agency staff to 
participate in its working groups; and, due to uncompetitive wages and a lack of capacity, 
that the MFPED is dependent on external advisors for direction (Piron and Norton, 
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2004:20). Thus, the Panos Institute (2002) claims that the World Bank owned the UPPAP 
consultation process and directed the debate. Indeed, as Piron and Norton, 2004:27) 
observed, though the MFPED and World Bank have dominated the drafting process, 
elected Members of Parliament and Local Council leaders were altogether excluded to 
ostensibly make the drafting process 'truly' from the perspective of civil society. 
Nonetheless, as Foster and Mijumbi (2002:34) conclude, the PRSP approach in Uganda 
"has been built on a fairly hierarchical and centralised planning and budget process, 
which leaves only limited space for participation by those affected by decisions taken by 
the centre." Taken from the information presented above, one can argue that participation 
in the PRSP process plays, at best, a complimentary role designed to legitimise 
preconfigured outcomes and agendas. 
Ill) Tyranny and the effects of social control: 
The origin of the PEAP dates back to a 1995 "GoU/World Bank seminar, at 
which concerns were expressed about the lack of systemic consideration of poverty 
impacts in the Bank's vision of growth in Uganda"48 (Piron and Norton, 2004:13). This 
would suggest that the intention of the PEAP was to move development policy away 
from an overemphasis on economic growth and towards poverty reduction. However, 
while the PEAP has been celebrated as an economic success, and has credited with 
allowing Uganda to maintain high levels of growth (between five and ten per cent 
annually) in terms of gross domestic product (World Bank, 2008), according to 
Muhumuza (2002), this "growth has not translated into improved standards of living for 
the majority of the poor. The reforms have also been characterised by increasing income 
48 GoU = Government of Uganda. 
91 
disparities." Economic disparities have not been remedied since Muhumuza's 2002 
analysis with, as the United Nations (2008) latest data indicated, 41.7 per cent of the rural 
population is living below Uganda's poverty line, compared to 37.4 per cent when the 
PRSP became official recognised in 2000. 
The most evident explanation for the failure to address poverty and economic 
disparities through the 'participatory' PEAP process would be the influence of dominant 
actors over policy formation process. In the regard, the following quote from Piron and 
Norton is revealing: 
"[d]uring our fieldwork, we were given the following interpretation of 
the 1995 meeting which eventually led to the drafting of the PEAP. 
President Museveni felt that policies of the Ministry of Finance, such as 
macroeconomic stability and growth, were not sufficiently focused on 
poverty reduction. The World Bank was invited to help persuade the 
President that the policies were adequate, but the outcome of the 
discussion was a decision to start a process to ensure that poverty 
became more central to policymaking. The President's vision of 
poverty reduction, based on state-led rural development, was also 
modified as a result of these consultations, which identified the need to 
give priority to the social structures" (2004:15) 
This leaves little doubt as to why "Uganda is seen by the IFIs to be receptive to their 
policy advice" (Piron and Norton, 2004:21). Furthermore, considering that half of 
Uganda's budget is comprised of foreign aid (Mwenda, 2006), and that Museveni's more 
'African Socialist' sentiments continue "to be moderated by IFIs and MFPED economic 
advisors" (Piron and Norton, 2004:17) it is not surprising that although Museveni initially 
rejected market-based development he began to reluctantly accept it in 1987, and then 
fully embraced it in the mid-1990s (Foster and Mijumbi, 2002). In response to 
accusations of'selling out' by 'radical theorists', as he puts it, Museveni writes: 
"I think where the IMF helped us was in making us realise the 
importance of macro-economic tools, such as letting prices find their 
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own level... that if you have the stimulus of free pricing, then it will be 
easy to produce ... it was actually more patriotic to privatise the 
economy than to leave large chunks of it in the public sector ... 
[because] keeping the economy in public hands will cause its decline." 
(1997:180) 
Finally, Museveni (1997:183) concludes that to eliminate rural poverty, after permitting 
private actors to be the primary development agent, "all the bureaucrats need to do is to 
ensure that people can communicate physically" to get their produce to the free market. 
This neoliberal approach to development, embraced by the broader PRSP agenda and 
supposedly the result of participatory processes, is actually mandated by the MFPED in 
close association with the World Bank, with little, if any, input from 'participants'. The 
PEAPs role in the struggle for social control is thus paramount, as it allows the World 
Bank and dominant classes in Uganda to maintain and extend control over the economy, 
while obscuring anti-democratic neoliberal reforms and privatization through 
'participatory' processes. 
Though rhetorically legitimised as targeting poverty reduction, the market-
oriented development agenda of the PEAP and denial of class allow its affiliated 
development projects to reinforce a priori class structures. The reinforcement of 
established class stratification can be seen by critically examining Uganda's Naads and 
Collaborative Forest Management (CFM) projects and programs, wherein participation 
has been reduced to a procedural exercise. According to Nahdy (2004), the Naads 
executive director, the program aims to 'empower' subsistence farmers through 
technology and market information while deepening decentralization and reducing costs 
by shifting extension services from public to private providers. 'Farmer groups', formed 
by Local Councils, are considered empowered through their participation in decision-
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making, however, their decision only qualifies for the program if selected activities are 
deemed marketable and profitable (MAAIF, 2000). If the activity is accepted by the 
Naads program, private providers are then subcontracted to provide training, materials, or 
demonstrations, but according the Uganda Monitor*9, only the relatively wealthy peasants 
have the capacity to host a demonstration site, and poor peasants can ill-afford to procure 
the equipment required to implement the training provided at demonstration sites. 
Information found in the Uganda National Household Survey 2005/2006, available in the 
Appendix, substantiates such claims. We can see from the statistics that the average rich 
peasant is visited by an extension service provider 0.92 times annually, and that 14 per 
cent of rich peasants receive services from the Naads annually. Conversely, the average 
poor peasant only received 0.11 visits by an extension service provider, and that only five 
per cent of poor peasants receive services from the Naads annually. 
In regards to forestry, the sector has been subject to the Forest Sector Umbrella 
Programme (FSUP) - an ostensibly pro-poor livelihoods approach to induce bottom-up 
participatory planning (Harrison and Goldman, 2002). The Forestry Department was 
divested and the National Forestry Authority (NFA) was born as a self-financing profit 
oriented authority. Management was decentralised to the private sector and LCs through 
Collaborative Forest Management (CFM) initiatives, "to encourage more active 
participation of local communities and farmers" (Banana et al, 2002). Through the use of 
Naads and NGOs, peasants are considered empowered to diversify their livelihood, but 
community initiatives are given only ten year permits, whereas private initiatives are 
rewarded with fifty year permits, creating "a disincentive for communities to undertake 
long term and lucrative investments" (EMPAFORM, 2006). Again, it is only "the 
49 Article by Kavuma, R.M., on 7 January 2010 titled "NAADS: Modernising Uganda's Farmers?" 
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relatively richer farmers that have been able to invest land, labour and cash who have 
been able to benefit from these initiatives, which it seems have not reached the poorest of 
the poor" (EMPAFORM, 2006). Also, now self-financing, the 'pro-poor' NFA seeks 
profit through charcoal production permits, charging prices that exclude poor peasants in 
favour of rich peasants. This leaves poor peasants performing sub-contracted work for 
rich peasants at rates below the market price of charcoal, effectively creating a permit 
rent for richer peasants through this 'pro-poor' and 'participatory' program (Bazaara, 
2003c). 
Local Councils 
I) Position or role in the broader 'good' governance model: 
Historically, the system of local governments in Uganda was at best ambiguous 
and inconsistent; it was patchwork system designed to meet the needs of colonial power. 
Local governments were not designed to be democratic or to invoke participation, but 
rather as a mechanism of social control and to facilitate economic extraction while 
minimizing the threat of dissent. This system was constitutionally maintained after 
independence50 until Amin dissolved all district councils and divided the country into ten 
provinces ruled by his appointees. The second Obote regime returned the local 
government system to its prior arrangements (Tukahebwa, 1998:12-14). Resistance 
Councils, introduced in the revolutionary environment of guerrilla war, promised to be 
the most radical form of popular democracy introduced in post-colonial Africa, and 
Uganda was to be its privileged host. Reflecting the NRA's dependence on the peasantry, 
the councils were to replace elitist, representative, and parliamentary types of democracy 
50 Buganda and Busuga were granted a federal and semi-federal status at independence, respectively, but 
were stripped of this status when Obote scrapped the first constitution in 1966 and introduced a centralized 
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with a grassroots, popular, and participatory system (Ddungo, 1994:365). As will be 
shown here, this promise was at best short-lived. 
When the NRM came to power it quickly moved to establish what was then the 
Resistance Council (RC) system throughout Uganda not only for sake of legitimacy, but 
to also address NRM financial weakness by 'downloading' social programs to the local 
level (Tukahebwa, 1998:14; Muhereza, 2003). A major presidential policy statement in 
1992 launched the current wave of decentralization, which was further crystallised in the 
1995 Constitution. This Constitution renamed Resistance Councils as Local Councils and 
spelled out the devolution of powers to local governments (Nsibambi, 1998a). The 1995 
Constitution necessitated the implementation of the 1993 Local Government (Resistance 
Councils) Statute which endorsed the "decentralisation of functions and powers and 
services to Local Government (Resistance Councils) to increase local democratic control 
and participation in decision-making, and to mobilise support for development which is 
relevant to local needs" (Republic of Uganda, 1993). When the PEAP was released in 
1997 another the 1997 Local Government Act was released in succession to: 
"[a]mend, consolidate and streamline the existing law on local 
governments in line with the constitution to give effect to the 
decentralisation and devolution of functions, powers and services; and 
provide for decentralisation at all levels of local government to ensure 
good governance and democratic participation in, and control of 
decision making by the people; and to provide for revenue and the 
political and administrative set-up of Local Governments; to provide 
for election of Local Councils and any other matters connected to the 
above" (Republic of Uganda, 1997). 
The system's hierarchy is designed to link the village (LCI) to the district council (LCV) 
through the parish, sub-county, and municipality levels (LCII, III, and IV, respectively). 
Each council consists of a cluster of councils immediately below them in the hierarchy. 
republic the following year. 
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Every LC includes a nine member executive committee with specific responsibilities 
(Youth Secretariat, Finance Secretariat, Vice-Chair, etc.)- Everyone in the village is 
considered a member of LCI, and the executive of all LCs are included in the LC directly 
above them (Republic of Uganda, 1997). 
The institutional design of Local Councils may be impressive, but their role in 
policy creation has considerably eroded from its origins in peasant mobilization during 
the 'Bush War' to challenge rural social control. Local Councils played no role in 
designing the PEAP or implementing its participatory component, The Uganda 
Participatory Poverty Assessment Process (UPPAP), and thus had no role in designing 
the PMA which set the guidelines for local development programs, such as the Naads or 
CFM. Where the Local Councils do play a role is in administering such programs. The 
Naads program is administered by all LC levels, who aide in the formation of 'farmer 
groups' of between fifteen and thirty to become 'clients' of the program (MAAIF, 2000). 
Local Councils also administer Collaborative Forest Management projects. The 
decentralization of forest management was initially included in the 1993 Local 
Government (Resistance Councils) Statute, but the initiative was ill-supported and re-
centralised two years later. When the PEAP was released in 1997, the Local Government 
Act re-decentralised forest management in a CFM scheme confined by the PMA as 
designed by the MFPED in partnership with the Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Industry 
and Fisheries (MAAIF) (Banana et al, 2002; Owino and Ndinga, 2004; Naidoo and 
Adamowicz, 2005; MAAIF & MFPED 2000). 
While almost all local issues were handled at the discretion of RCs during the 
'Bush War', RC/LC functions have been reduced substantially through the centralization 
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of power and implementation of PEAP mandates. The inherent paradox of Uganda's 
decentralization for 'empowerment' program is that on the one hand its breadth of formal 
powers (political, economic, financial) given to local governments far exceeds those 
previously devolved in the country and throughout Sub-Saharan Africa, yet, on the other 
hand, the depth of devolution is significantly limited in terms of discretion over use of 
these powers (Kiyaga-Nsubuga and Olum, 2009). When Brock et al (2003:13) conducted 
their research into LCs, they took note of a general sentiment expressed by discussion 
groups that while the RCs '"gave people power to control their own destiny', the LC 
system in its current incarnation is only used to levy taxes, since LC leaders know what 
each resident owns." This suggestion is echoed by Francis and James' (2003) study that 
found villagers identified LCIII as a tax-collection agency, with little evidence suggesting 
local retention of such taxes, despite the increased burden of social programming costs. 
This leaves LCs largely dependent on grant funding from the central government 
- two thirds of it conditional - to implement policies likewise designed at the centre 
(Pifon and Norton, 2004:29), leaving some to doubt the ability of LCs to act 
independently from the centre (Bazaara, 2003 c). While legally, laws that do not 
contradict the centre are permitted, in practice this independence is obfuscated by 
executive interference and technocrat usurpation of planning (Bazaara, 2003c: 17). Brock 
et al (2003:20) argue, conversely, that their respondents indicated that "where the 
Movement does directly influence policy, it is at the central rather than the decentralized 
levels of government." Nonetheless, a more critical analysis suggests this to be as much 
indicative of lower level LCs not having significant policy making discretion as it is 
indicative of lower level LC being autonomous organs of policy formation. With policy 
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formation being highly centralised and local units primarily responsible for administering 
and collecting the taxes to pay for such policies, there would be little utility in influencing 
local level policy. As such, Nsabagasani (2003) has noticed that "instead of identifying 
local people's problems and pressing for them to be addressed by higher authorities, LCs 
have been used as channels through which directives are passed on to communities." 
II) Participation and the struggle for social control: 
Ddungo's (1994) study into the decline of RCs as a force of peasant power 
provides us with a compelling glimpse into the foundation of Uganda's participatory 
governance model, and its descent into a means of social control instead of a means of 
challenging control. Limited to forty homes, during the 'Bush War' the RCs acted as a 
form of self-government among the poor peasantry who worked cooperatively with 
leaders it had the power to recall. The RCs presided over almost all grassroots issues, and 
almost all affairs became politicised. Support and opposition to the formation of RCs can 
be seen along class lines. On one hand, rich peasants, rural capitalists, chiefs and absentee 
landlords opposed their formation because RCs constituted a threat to their economic and 
political dominance. On the other hand, poor peasants, and some middle peasants, saw 
RCs as an opportunity to advance their claims to dispossessed lands. 
Once a proactive organ of popular power, the survival of RCs became 
questionable as they were depoliticised once the NRM came to power; attendance waned 
and elections became a mockery. The elite classes that fled during the war returned to 
assume power in the RCs; thereby representing a failure to transform socioeconomic 
stratification (Ddungo, 1994:365-85). Analyses from other researchers share Ddungo's, 
demonstrating the devolution of RCs from a mechanism to express popular peasant 
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power during the guerrilla war to an instrument to prevent mobilization thereafter, and 
finally to a device to ensure the election of NRM candidates (Olaka-Onyango, 1989, 
2000; Mamdani, 1991; Sabiti-Makara et al, 1996). 
Local Councils have moved far away from their Resistance Council predecessor's 
legacy as an instrument for poor peasants to challenge rural political-economic 
contradictions and landlord class dominance. This can be confirmed by examining which 
class now controls LCs. Though electoral mechanisms have gone through considerable 
changes,51 class dominance has not changed since rich peasants and rural capitalists 
returned to take-over RCs in the Luwero Triangle after the 'Bush War' - and research 
findings have been remarkably consistent. Francis and James (2003) found that LC 
membership is exclusively drawn from "households in the highest income strata. Poorer 
individuals cannot afford the 'goodwill gestures', such as beer, soap, or salt, handed out 
as an inducement to potential voters in elections to all levels of local government." Piron 
and Norton's (2004:30) respondents describe councillors as "local elites with little 
genuine interest in the opinions of their poorer constituents." This is most recently echoed 
in a recent study that found: 
"as much as it would appear that every citizen above the age of 
eighteen is free to contest local elections, the reality is that because of 
the 'monetised' nature of politics in the country, many peasants can ill 
afford to buy their way into political office. This monetised electoral 
process has now taken root to the extent that even the annulment of 
results by the courts has not deterred those with money from buying 
their way into power. This elite capture of the government process has 
become endemic" (Kiyaga-Nsubuga and Olum, 2009). 
Ergo, LC elections in Uganda have been characterised as a competition for favours and 
51 Originally, voting was performed using a highly visible lining-up system which exposed vulnerable 
groups - particularly youth and women - to patriarchal wrath. A secret ballot system soon replaced this. 
Also, direct elections - initially reserved for RC/LCI and RC/LCII have been extended to all levels on the 
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lobbying, with the winner being the highest bidder; the ability of peasants to determine 
who represents them locally tends to be exaggerated (Namara and Nsabagasani, 2003). 
Lastly, peasant participation in the LC system has eroded sharply. After the 
election is held in LCI, Tukahebwa (1998:26) found that the executive committee rarely 
convenes public meetings and assumes all council responsibilities in regards to decision 
making. The study found this to be consistent with the LCII level, where 63 per cent of 
the respondents indicating they do not participate in any decision making. Higher level 
LCs are more remote to most citizens, and although meetings are considered open they 
are sparsely attended. The study found citizens to be disinterested and apathetic, with 
participation being "largely seen as a government obligation than a people-driven 
process." Francis and James (2003) found that patronage and technocratic forms of local 
governance leaves little room for participation, characterizing the LC system as bringing 
"control closer to the people." 
Ill) Tyranny and the effects of social control: 
Tyranny - the exercise of arbitrary and excessive power to exploit and oppress -
is best demonstrated not through particular programs, however, but through the activities 
of Local Councils. As mentioned above, taking advantage of LC knowledge of local 
ownership and production, the central government primarily uses LCs for tax collection 
purposes (Brock et al, 2003). This is not to say tax collection is necessarily tyrannical, but 
it becomes so when little of that tax money is retained in the locality (as little as five per 
cent), as uncovered by Francis and James (2003). Locally collected tax revenues include 
market dues, licensing fees, and most controversially, the graduated personal tax levied 
on all adult males and salaried women. The annual collected of graduated personal tax is 
basis of universal adult suffrage (Ddungo, 1994:373; Tukahebwe, 1998:26; Bazaara, 2003:15). 
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most unpopular and is accompanied by armed police, the use of force, and imprisonment 
of evaders (Francis and James, 2003). 
Local Councils have also become highly susceptible to elite capture, and as 
Kiyaga-Nsubuga and Olum (2009) contend, local elites are not using their captured 
political power benevolently. They cite a lack of political awareness among the poor 
peasantry as leaving the LCs susceptible to policies and decisions that serve the narrow 
interests of elites while freezing out the interests of the poor. While Tukahebwa 
(1998:26) describes LCI and LCII as mere administrative units "preoccupied with settling 
disputes among the citizens," this research took place before the 1998 Land Act, which in 
following PEAP directives, allowed for the conversion of customary land rights into 
freehold titles (Republic of Uganda, 1998). Property disputes and land transactions are 
adjudicated at the LCI level, with land committees and boards and the parish and district 
levels approving/disapproving applications for free-hold conversion of customary land 
(Republic of Uganda, 1997). 
Generally, ten per cent of the total land sale price is levied as compensation for 
LCIs, land boards, and committees. With little retention of tax revenues, facilities such 
sales are one of the few recourses for LCs to pay for social programming costs 
(Lumonya, 2009). As Akin, et al. (2005) indicate, due to the problem of securing funds, 
decentralization has harmed the quality of social programming, and many LCs attempt to 
'free-ride' off neighbour regions by diverting medical patients, or by administering user 
fees. As Lumonya (2009) suggests, poor peasants are being compelled to sell their land 
52 I wish to express gratitude to Daniel Lumonya, a doctoral candidate at Cornell University, for permitting 
the citation of his presentation made at a The Journal of Peasant Studies workshop in the fall of 2009.1 
encourage the reader to follow Lumonya's progress as he continues his work on issues of land use, land 
reform, and land dispossession in Uganda - which must be acknowledged to be outside the scope of this 
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out of economic distress caused by such user fees, and indeed, the total size of privatised 
land doubled shortly after the PEAP was implemented (Place and Otsuku, 2000). Caswell 
(2002) argues that land privatization and transactions have increased peasant 
landlessness. While no concrete figures have been found to verify such an observation, a 
Food and Agriculture Organization (2006) study suggests that land privatization has had 
recursive implications for poor peasants, writing on land reforms in Uganda that: 
"[a]n elite minority has tended to benefit from reforms while the 
majority of the poor and vulnerable end up worse off as institutions and 
systems that supported their livelihoods and gave them a sense of 
security are marginalized and replaced by modern institutions" 
(Odhiambo, 2006). 
Bazaara (2003 a) contends that no ordinary peasant can afford to convert their land to 
freehold tenure, let alone purchase land made available for sale, and therefore suggests 
the Land Act was designed to attract foreign buyers.53 However, as Lumonya (2009) has 
observed, poor peasants are turning to banks to secure loans to pay titling costs, and 
dispossessed land is being accumulated by local elites who control the LC. Effectively, 
with ten per cent of the land sales fees being returned to the control of LCs, and with 
elites having authoritarian control, this would amount to subsidised capital accumulation 
for rural bourgeois elements. 
Civil Society 
I) Position or role in the broader 'good' governance model: 
thesis. 
53 A series of reports in the Daily Monitor seem to validate concerns over foreign land grabs. Aug 2, 2009: 
16,000 peasants were evicted from thirty-six square miles in Kiboga because, according to villagers, the 
land was sold to French investors by the government. Nov 26, 2009: an amendment to the 1998 Land Act 
was being debated by Parliament that would see landlords sent to jail for seven years if they evict tenants; 
but opposition MP Dan Okello claims this same amendment includes a clause that would introduce a land 
tax meant to induce peasants to sell land to "NRM agents or foreigners" (Article can be seen here: 
http://www.parties.ug/news.php?article= 174&return=articles.php: as of 15 September 2010; originally 
obtained at same url on 16 December 2009). Mar 25, 2009: Museveni's declares intention to limit foreign 
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Once all but smothered out of existence by prior regimes, a plethora of 
international and local civil society organizations (CSOs) have surfaced since the NRM 
came to power in Uganda. However, studies show that this emergence is as indicative of 
external agendas and international patterns as it is indicative of more lenient government 
policies (Dicklitch, 1998:8; Brock et al, 2003:21). CSOs have played an important but 
largely administrative and implementation role within Uganda's 'good' governance 
structure, beginning with the UPPAP process. Although Blackburn, Chambers, and 
Gaventa (2000) call the UPPAP a "model for the future" owned by the Ugandan 
government, the government's leadership role in design quickly gave-way to a multi-
stakeholder approach involving donors, research institutions, and NGOs: with the latter, 
and Oxfam specifically, given implementation responsibility (MFPED, 2004). 
CSOs are also hired by Local Councils as part of the Naads program to facilitate 
discussions with 'farmers groups' to identify the needs of peasants. The needs get relayed 
back to Naads officials who then subcontract to individuals, advisors, professional 
companies or CSOs to provide training, supply materials, or set-up a demonstration site 
(MAAIF, 2000). In regards to Collaborative Forest Management (CFM) projects, CSOs 
are heavily relied upon to identify potential forestry livelihood diversification strategies 
(Bazaara, 2003c). Personal connections between CSOs and state organs are considered 
the most important trait for in terms of procuring such contracts (Goetz and Lister, 2001) 
II) Participation and the struggle for social control: 
Participation of CSOs in policy formation processes are by invitation only, and 
invitation is predominately on the basis of how much policy makers will benefit from 
each particular CSO's inclusion, and not on "any conception of the right to contribute to 
land purchases to between three and fifty acres (this has not been re-addressed since). 
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policy formation" (Lister and Nyamugasira, 2003). Indeed, Brock et al (2003:14) found 
that government officials dominate policy formation processes, and that organizations 
were reluctant to participate in policy formation, even at the local level. Organizations are 
legally permitted to lobby governments concerning policy formation and implementation, 
but "[g]iven the concentration of policy formation at the national level, this role is usually 
played by CSOs at the national or international level. Moreover, it tends to be carried out 
by INGOs" (Lister and Nyamugasira, 2003). This means, the limited and selective use of 
civil society in policy formation tends to be drawn from those organizations furthest 
removed from the poor peasantry. The Development Network of Indigenous Voluntary 
Associations' (DENIVA)54 own statistics indicate that 41 per cent of respondents 
characterised 'poor people' as being either excluded or severely under-represented by 
CSOs, which is much higher compared to other marginalised groups;55 the 'upper class', 
on the other hand, is the only group thought to be equitably represented by the majority 
of respondents. 
With government dominance over civil society in policy formation circles, it is 
not surprising that those who disagree with or are disadvantaged by proposed policies are 
systematically excluded from the processes (Lister and Nyamugasira, 2003). According 
to Dicklitch (1998:25-6), "the NRM regime's attempts to co-opt NGOs into its national 
development strategy, so that NGOs are vehicles of NRM-inspired and led development," 
adding that "those that are considered too political are labeled sectarian and even called 
criminal by the President and either co-opted or muzzled." Hearn explains that 
54 DENIVA "is a Ugandan Network of Non-Governmental and Community Based Organizations" 
("http://www.deniva.or.ug/deniva/). 
55 No other group was considered to be excluded, but 26% considered religious minorities, 24% for ethnic 
minorities, 22% for the rural population in general, and 15% for women, were thought to be 'severely 
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"donors have been successful in influencing the current vision of civil 
society ... so that a vocal, well-funded section of it, which intervenes 
on key issues of national development strategy, acts not as a force for 
challenging the status quo, but for building societal consensus for 
maintaining it" (Hearn, 2001; emphasis in original). 
When Hearn asked USAID if they could recount instances of CSOs challenging the 
development agenda established by international actors, the reply was "No". Conversely, 
USAID offered instances where Parliament had challenged the externally established 
agenda; however, Parliament has no role in designing donor-funded programs. This leads 
Hearn to suggest that the democratically elected Parliament would be a better outlet for 
political leverage than CSOs that are dependent on donor financing. 
Dependent as they are on donor financing, many CSOs have been compelled to 
adopt 'gap-filling' roles to satisfy the "economy of survival" (Dicklitch, 1998:102),56 
created by state withdrawal from basic service delivery in areas such as health, education, 
and sanitation. Many, however, have not chosen the service delivery business by default 
but by design, focusing on capturing funding and work rather than working towards 
democratization and empowerment (Brock et al, 2003). Dicklitch (1998:8) considers 
some CSOs to be of questionable origin, attributing the ever-growing roster of CSOs to 
the chase for foreign grants, characterizing them as "entrepreneurs tapping into a growing 
industry." What's more, DENIVA's report on Civil Society in Uganda found that: 
"61% of respondents to the community survey did not mention any 
organization helping poor people in their community to improve their 
lives in the past 12 months, reflecting a common allegation by the 
public that a majority of CSO activities target the productive poor, 
rather than the very poor" (2006:76). 
under-represented' by civil society organizations (DENIVA, 2006:29). 
56 Of the 434 indigenous NGOs in Dicklitch's study, 40.8 per cent were found primarily to be 'gap-fillers'. 
This figure balloons to 81.2 per cent when religious NGOs are included; religious NGOs primarily are 
preoccupied with 'gap-filling'. Whole voluntary organizations make up 14.1 per cent of NGOs, people's 
organizations only amount to a miniscule 1.2 per cent. The remaining 2.4 per cent are classified as 'other', 
and are mostly comprised of NGO networks (Dicklitch, 1998:126). 
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Given that CSOs, dependent on foreign funding, fail to challenge theneoliberal agenda 
which they are used to legitimise, is that building capacity among - and educating - the 
poor to allow for direct advocacy is considered merely "a long term CSO strategy" 
(Lister and Nyamugasira, 2003). 
Regardless, DENIVA (2006:26) argues that recently "people and people's 
organizations have been more forthright claiming spaces for protest." However, their 
argument rests on membership figures, including 80 per cent of respondents identifying 
themselves as members of a CSO - though, 52 per cent of these claimed membership to a 
religious group compared to only 25 per cent claiming membership to 'self-help' groups, 
80 per cent claiming to have attended a community meeting within the past year, and 63 
per cent claiming to have coalesced with others to raise an issue (compared to the African 
average of 44 per cent). DENIVA credits this participation to the reach of LCs to every 
village;57 however, they fail to critically consider the type of organizations that exist, the 
work these organizations perform, the content of such meetings, or why individuals 
coalesce outside organizations to press issues. 
The largest civil society organization that claims to represent peasants is the 
Uganda National Farmers Federation (UNFFE), with a claimed membership of over six 
million. The UNFFE was formed in 1992 as an umbrella association of district level 
farming groups, but changed to a Federation in 2002 to accommodate its various 
'commodity associations' and 'service provider' members. Its formation is tied to the 
Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Industry and Fisheries (MAIIF) and it has had a close 
57 One would assume that DENIVA credits LCs with increasing participation in CSOs because, as LCs 
have seen their revenue retention dwindle concurrent with an increased responsibility for social 
programming, they have become dependent on recruiting NGO to fulfill these responsibilities. What one 
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relationship with the MAIIF over the years, with several overlapping senior officials as 
well as Members of Parliament. Indeed, UNFFE's main priority is to "[strengthen the 
Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Industry of Fisheries" (UNFFE, 2009). Their central 
argument is that while PEAP subsidiary policies and institutions controlled by the 
MFPED were unveiled, such as the Naads, institutional mandates overlapped and 
responsibilities became superfluous; and thus such institutions should give way to 
MAIFF authority. The UNFFE thus, instead of advocating on behalf of poor peasants, 
appears to be engaged in a power struggle between the MAIFF and the MFPED. 
Indeed, most 'peasant organizations' are inextricably tied to government bodies. 
More local than the UNFFE are various District Farmer's Associations, which are formed 
by Naads, with the objective to organise producers of similar crops for purposes of 
reaching external markets (Brock et al, 2003:28). The Farmer's Associations are a needed 
and consistent component of the PMA, and thus exist on the basis of a particular 
government program that, as shown above, systematically benefits rich peasants over 
poor peasants. Such associations ought not to be considered as any sort of peasant 
advocacy group, let along autonomous organization. 
The only visible organization that advocates for poor peasants it the Uganda Land 
Alliance, which demands land rights for the poor and marginalised, particularly women. 
It is, however, a consortium of 48 local and international NGOs which operate at the 
national level, and can therefore not be confused as autonomous poor peasant 
organization, but rather an organization that advocates for peasant - and women's in 
particular - land rights.58 The efforts of the ULA are welcome, but should not be a 
should also take note of is that approval of LCs is mandatory for joining DEN1VA. 
58 View their website at http:///www.ulaug.org 
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considered as a substitute for grassroots organizations directly controlled by, and 
representative of, poor peasants. 
Tukahebwa (1998:28) found that organizations attempting to influence policy 
simply "do not exist at the grassroots level where they are most needed." Several years 
later, Brock et al confirm this finding, writing that: 
"civil society or autonomous spaces existing in village or sub-county 
policy processes is minimal. Several references [by interviewees] to the 
collapse of agricultural cooperatives in the mid 1980s provide 
testimony of the decline of other local institutions alongside the rise 
and consolidation of the LC system" (2003:14). 
An inverse relationship between local governance and autonomous peasants 
organizations therefore seems to exist; in other words, as institutions of 'good' 
governance increase, organizations that represent poor peasants decrease. 
There is, however, appears to be a re-emergence of the cooperative movement, 
despite - or more cynically because of- its legacy of cooptation. Kabwegyere (2000:97), 
a senior NRM official, recognises the historical cooptation of peasant cooperatives but 
claims "since the NRM came to power the people have been encouraged to take the bull 
by the forms and make cooperatives their own." Acknowledging this paternalistic history, 
the newly formed Uganda Cooperative Alliance (UCA) avows a new generation - based 
on entrepreneurship, committed and visionary leaders, member participation, sustainable, 
bottom-up growth, women and youth inclusion, and diversified activities - will be able to 
avoid such a downfall (Msemakwela, UCA General Secretary, 2009). Its report on 
advocacy in the most recent annual report, however, is limited to less than half a page 
(out of forty) that focused on a "lobbying campaign to win as many MPs on the side of 
cooperatives as possible" (UCA, 2009:1). It offers no specifics other than mentioning 
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meetings with the Ministry of Tourism, Trade and Industry as well as the Minister of 
State for Microfinance. The Bagisu Cooperative Alliance (BCU) mentioned the in the 
second chapter of this thesis, has also been revived despite political pressure against it, 
and is described by Wiegratz (2010) as an expression of peasant desire to struggle for a 
better life and regain a sense of power while confronting "a sense of powerlessness." Its 
re-emergence is a very recent occurrence, however, and has yet to stake a major role in 
Ugandan politics.59 Cooperative, nonetheless, are not autonomous peasant organizations 
and reportedly remain subject to strong government interference. 
Ill) Tyranny and the effects of social control: 
The lack of advocacy groups based in poor peasant organizations, or the 
coalescence of poor peasants into groups that can advance their interests, not only allows 
poor peasants to be more easily excluded from policy circles but also engenders 
economic exploitation by dominant classes within rural communities - in particular, the 
"trade practices between smallholder farmers and traders in rural markets" (Wiegratz, 
2010). Wiegratz considers neoliberal reforms to be an attempt to transform Ugandan 
peasants into 'homo economicus\ that is, rational utility maximisers engaged in cost-
benefit analysis, self-interested economic individualism, egoism, and capitalist 
rationalism. It is argued that economic, health, and education liberalization, and a 
weakened public sector, has diminished poor peasant bargaining power vis-a-vis traders. 
Individualised without group representation, farmers are without leverage and due to an 
'economy of survival' are forced into accepted traders' malpractices and low sales prices. 
59 On 21 January 2011 the Uganda Monitor reported that Uganda's High Court overturned the Registrar of 
Cooperative Societies suspension of the BCU board, which was deemed unlawful without consulting the 
Uganda Cooperative Alliance. This court decision was celebrated "as the first step towards liberating the 
union from government interference." 
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Traders - considered to be backed by local political elites in exchange for cheap inputs -
routinely negotiate transactions with children, arriving at homesteads where they are 
informed that parents are absent. Wiegratz (2010) describes how brokers have recently 
emerged to negotiate transactions between peasants and traders for a cut of roughly 10 
per cent; the latter two both claim an inability/unwillingness to circumvent brokers 
(considered to be unnecessary) over concerns of broker political/economic connections 
and intimidation tactics. Yet, according to Wiegratz, when peasants approach local 
councils they are confronted by a dismissive response that suggests Uganda's new, 
liberalised economy entails a non-interventionist policy. Wiegratz's respondents 
"reasoned that the malpractices were applied by the various actors in order to keep them 
poor and subsequently govern and exploit them with more ease." Many reportedly long 
for the cooperative era, when there was at least a semblance of fairness due to the ability 
of peasants to negotiate in group settings. 
Conclusion 
The objective of this Chapter was to demonstrate how the conceptual 
manipulation of participation in mainstream development discourse has allowed the 
institutionalization of participation to retain strong elements of social control and to 
countervail the democratic struggles of lower classes. Data was collected on the 
formation of central government, the 'good' governance development agenda, the control 
of local government units, and the use of civil society. 
Research found that the NRJVI, who originally came to power based on peasant 
support of Resistance Councils, has operated in a de facto one-party atmosphere for much 
of its time in national government. The longstanding refusal to accept multiparty politics 
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was based on, among other things, a flawed notion of Ugandan classlessness, but in 
actuality it facilitated elite electoral dominance. Though a return to official multipartyism 
has now been permitted, constitutional amendments, intimidation tactics, and 'vote 
buying' have sustained a NRM regime and Museveni government that has lost touch with 
the resistance to control that brought them to power. 
It has been found that the Ugandan parliament and other elected officials have 
been circumvented in designing the PEAP - the driver of development policy. The fact 
that the PEAP is under the official direction of the Ministry of Finance, Planning and 
Economic Development (MFPED) does not boost confidence of actual domestic 
'authorship', as the highly authoritative and internally autonomous department is 
externally dependent on - and staffed by - donors, and specifically the World Bank. 
Though drafted before any 'participatory' processes were put in place, the PEAP has 
entrenched a neoliberal development agenda under the auspices of 'good' governance. 
Participatory processes that have since been adopted have been used to sensitise the 
populace to - and diminish resistance against - unpopular policies that facilitate 
economic dominance over poor peasants. 
Resistance Councils (RCs) were introduced during the NRA/M's 'Bush War' as a 
radical form of grassroots popular democracy; they initially promised to empower poor 
peasants to displace elite dominance. RC popularity disintegrated as they were de-
politicised once the NRM formed national government, participation waned and elites re-
claimed power in rural areas. While there is great breadth (range of issues) around 
decentralization, there is little depth in terms of power to formulate policy, and the Local 
Councils (LC) that have replaced RCs are used as channels to pass down directives, as 
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evident by funding conditionalities. Rather than being used to identify local needs and 
influence policy from the bottom, LCs are used primarily for the forceful collection of 
taxes, little of which is retained locally. Furthermore, coupled with poor financing is the 
inducement - provided by financial compensation for processing sales, and permitted 
through privatization - for LCs to facilitate the accumulation of land among elites, and 
the dispossession of land among poor peasants unable to pay for fee-based social 
programming. 
The number of CSOs operating in Uganda has exploded since the mid-1990s and 
they have ostensibly been given a key role in development policy formation. Though 
eager to procure recently privatised service delivery and social programming contracts, 
CSOs are reluctant to participate in policy formation. Those who do participate do so by 
invitation only; these CSOs have largely replaced parliament in donor-driven policy 
formation, and their dependency on donor funding engenders systemic support rather 
than advocating on behalf of the interests of poor peasants. Left to compete in a 
neoliberal economy without any representation as a class - such as autonomous peasant 
organizations, strong cooperatives, or the ability to collectively negotiate economic 
relations - poor peasants have been disempowered economically, as well as politically. 
Market-based development programs benefit the CSO development industry and rich 
peasants through service contracts and extension services, but these benefits fail to reach 
the poor peasantry. This can be seen through institutional 'participatory' reforms to 
forestry that abet rent-seeking behaviour, extension services through the NAADS 
program which primarily benefit rich farmers, and service and social programming 
contracts that benefit CSOs but leave poor peasants unable to afford user-fees. 
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Chapter Four: Conclusion 
As stated in the Introduction, the primary question that has guided this thesis is: 
What is the nature of the relationship between 'good' governance defined participation 
and the struggle for social control in Uganda? To answer this question, a theoretical 
framework was developed to understand the nature of participation in Uganda. The 
framework was informed by literature on the history of the struggle for social control and 
peasant resistance to control in Sub-Saharan Africa, followed by a critical analysis of 
mainstream participation as part of the World Bank's 'good' governance agenda, PRSPs, 
and the (re)re-conceptualization - the first reconceptualization being that of the World 
Bank's 'good' governance agenda - of participation as tyranny. 
From these bodies of literature, it was found that as elite classes struggle for 
social control, poor peasants have historically been given subordinate citizenry rights; 
however, poor peasants have resisted social control and elite dominance. Political elites 
have responded to challenges posed by poor peasants by granting limited democratic 
concessions while maintaining political centrality, which has been suggested to 
intentionally placate peasant protest while covertly confining the political role of poor 
peasants. The analysis of the 'good' governance agenda found that it continues the 
struggle for social control by embracing the concept of participation, but reversing its 
practice from a radical exercise that challenges social control, to a technical procedure 
that legitimises neoliberal policies as democratic and part of bottom-up processes. Hence, 
participation, considered to be part of 'good' governance, has reinforced a priori social 
structures by detaching itself from broad concerns over social, economic, and political 
structural transformation. Through the use of 'participation', alternative political 
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processes have been created to circumvent elected representatives, displacing them with 
an exclusionary use of bourgeois-staffed civil society agents, private actors and donors. 
Far from empowering, the participatory framework defined by 'good' governance has 
confined the political role of poor peasants - shutting them out of development policy 
dialogues and leaving then with no democratic body whose power has not likewise been 
reduced through 'good' governance. Participation has thus become a central tool among 
elite classes in their struggle for social control, and has therefore a new form of tyranny. 
Informed by the theoretical foundation established above, the thesis then sought to 
prove that 'good' governance 'participation' in Uganda has reinforced the dominant 
position of elite classes, using a Marxist dialectical materialist methodology. Given its 
use as a model of 'good' governance, Uganda has been used as a case study because of its 
considerable potential to uncover patterns that were abstractly articulated in the literature 
review, by illustrating the role participation plays in the struggle for social control in 
concrete terms. Data presented pertained to the historical nature of the struggle for social 
control and peasant resistance to control in Uganda, processes of political centralization 
and government formation, the alternative political processes created by 'good' 
governance, and the role of local government units and civil society within the 'good' 
governance framework, and the implications for poor peasants. 
The second chapter examined the historical nature of the struggle for social 
control in Uganda, and peasant resistance to control. The chapter found poor peasants to 
have historically been denied the same citizenry rights of more elite classes, and that 
through taxation, forced labour, land rents, and threats of land alienation poor peasants 
were compelled to engage in unequal socio-economic relations with dominant classes. 
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Poor peasants resisted social control through armed rebellion, riots and protests and were 
able to make limited economic and political gains, such as rent control and a partially 
elected Lukiiko (Buganda's legislature). Much of these gains were reversed after 
independence by the Obote and Amin regimes, which used military intimidation to 
further social control and suspended voting rights. Peasants continued to resist social 
control, particularly through the Rwenzururu movement that temporarily established an 
alternative government, and the National Resistance Movement that would eventually 
form national government. 
The third chapter then sought to prove elite classes, domestic and international, 
have emplaced a system of 'good' governance which reinforces elite dominance and 
social control, but obscures it in the language of 'participation'. The analysis validated 
the thesis' hypothesis that 'good' governance participation has reinforced elite dominance 
in Uganda. It was found that poor peasants had little to no influence in the formation of 
the Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP) in 1997 and its subsequent revisions; rather, 
consultations were used to ameliorate resistance to unpopular neoliberal macro-economic 
policies. Furthermore, Members of Parliament and other elected officials along with 
dissenting civil society organizations (CSOs) were also excluded from the formation 
process, which was dominated by the Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic 
Development (MFPED) and the World Bank. Resistance Councils (RCs) have been 
transformed into elite-dominated Local Councils (LCs), which are used to localise control 
through taxation, funding conditionalities, and the facilitation of land dispossession. 
CSOs have flourished under 'good' governance, but their participation in policy 
formation is selective, and their dependency on donor funding limit the ability to criticize 
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policy. With their existence as a class denied, poor peasants are forced to compete in a 
neoliberal market economy on an individual basis where they are routinely exploited, and 
are denied the benefits rich peasants and CSOs receive from 'pro-poor' development 
programs. This data demonstrates that the 'good' governance model of participation 
deployed in Uganda has been a tyrannical system which abets elite political and 
economic dominance over poor peasants. Therefore, it is the contention of this thesis that 
participatory governance models are best understood as a new and sophisticated tool of 
class struggle, wherein elite classes (domestic and international) attempt to politically and 
economically control and subvert popular classes: a system of elite tyranny over poor 
peasants. 
The language of participation has been rhetorically attractive for those in power; 
its ubiquitous discourse can be manipulated to legitimise and tyrannically secure the 
established interests of capital and elite classes, while clandestinely shutting the poor out 
of national and local policy dialogues. Leaving poor peasants with no discernable 
political body that reflects their interests as a class - as 'class' does not exist in the 
lexicon of mainstream participation discourse - 'good' governance participation 
effectively amounts to a bourgeois dictatorship masquerading as a benevolent regime of 
empowerment. Mainstream participation literature - particularly that of the World Bank -
imagines rural societies as homogenous communities, thereby permitting the erroneous 
assumption of identical material needs, interests, and capabilities. Conceived 
homogeneity implies that development policies are designed on the basis of classless 
communities, which do not exist in Uganda. Detached from any means of challenging 
political-economic structures, 'empowering' and 'pro-poor' programs influenced by 
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'participation' can therefore be used to reinforce a priori social structures in a class 
differentiated reality. 
There are some limits to this study, however, that must be acknowledged. There is 
more than one kind of oppression, and social control can extend beyond class to 
encompass gender, cultural, and ethnic dimensions among others. By concentrating on 
class, there are likely some powerful criticisms and perhaps justifications of 'good' 
governance participation not considered in this study. That said, other dimensions of 
social control are not mutually exclusive to that of class, and by limiting its scope, this 
thesis is able to provide greater depth to its critique on participation than would have 
otherwise been possible. Furthermore, while 'good' governance certainly has 
implications for patriarchy, for example, it is the contention of this thesis that it is class 
struggle for social control and resistance to control which have primarily shaped the 
'good' governance agenda, and therefore its framework of participation. 
Concerning the likely conclusions from non-Marxist theoretical perspectives, this 
study has not provided enough evidence to draw upon. Nonetheless, from the information 
presented, the likely conclusion from a subaltemist perspective is more apparent that of 
feminism, or others. Subalternists would similarly reject the model of participation 
deployed in Uganda. Even with a downgraded importance placed on class, the 
centralization of policy formation leaves little, if any, space for meaningful community-
led policy formation. Again, though, such an approach may be blind to the intra-
community struggle for social control and disparities presented in this thesis. 
Further studies are needed, particularly studies concerning the ability of poor 
peasants to resist dominance given the brevity of social control embodied by the 'good' 
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governance agenda. These studies could focus on poor peasant resistance outside 
institutionalized political avenues, such as social movements. Such studies may also 
focus on the ability of poor peasants to resist social control in conventional political 
avenues - that is, political processes circumvented by 'good' governance processes, such 
as parliament and oppositional political parties. 
It has been a primary contention of this thesis that poor peasants possess the 
power to invoke social change. It would be a stretch to assume that the 'good' 
governance agenda has succeeded in entrenching elite social control to such an extent 
that poor peasants no longer have the capacity to resist control. The elements of social 
control produced by the agenda, however, which extends what falsely appear to be 
democratic and participatory processes to every village, may help us understand the lack 
of powerful peasant movements in Sub-Saharan Africa. Nonetheless, this explanation 
must only be considered partial, as the 'good' governance agenda is pursued in other 
locations, such as Latin America, where vibrant peasant movements continue to resist 
control and advance the interests of poor peasants. Thus, the question must now turn 
towards how poor peasants in Sub-Saharan Africa may respond to new developments 
given this new tool used by elites in their struggle for social control - a question 
becoming increasing important as the international revaluation of land and occurrences of 
land grabs and dispossession continue. The recent discovery of oil repositories and the 
movement towards exploiting this resource in Uganda make this question of prime 
importance concerning Ugandan poor peasants. The process of social chance is ongoing, 
and we need to know more about how poor peasants will shape future social structures. 
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Appendix: 
Peasant Households in Uganda (Class Averages) 
Observations (totals) 
Household Size (members) 
Means of Production 
Acres of land cultivated by farmstead 
Percentage of land with 'good' soil 
Value of labour implements (US$) 
Value of fertilizer applied (US$) 
Value of pesticides, herbicides 
and fungicides applied (US$) 
Relationship to Means of Production 
Labour days performed by household 
Labour days hired 
Distance from homestead to farm (km) 
Participation in non-agricultural 
employment (%) 






















































50 116 231 
Production 
Value of agricultural output (US$) 
Value of agricultural output per acre 
(US$) 
Percent of land devoted to traditional 
subsistence crops (cassava, beans, 
maize) 
Percent of land devoted to traditional 
export crops (coffee, banana) 
Extension Services Received 
Number of visits 



















Source: Uganda Bureau of Statistics, Uganda National Household Survey 2005/2006, 
Version 1.0 of the public use dataset (August 
Archive, www.ubos.org 
; 2008), provided by the National Data 
Note: applicable figures are given in yearly amounts. Peasant households without direct 
ownership or user rights to land are not included in this survey, and no reliable figures for 
landless peasants are available. 
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